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 Since the aftermath of the Korean War, the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has pursued a policy of nuclear and military development 
in order to protect itself from the threat of foreign intervention, namely the United States 
and its allies. Under Kim Jong-il’s rule, the DPRK signed the non-proliferation treaty 
(NPT) and worked towards denuclearization with the Six Party Talks; however, efforts 
halted as the DPRK left the NPT and withdrew from these talks. The situation has only 
escalated under the rule of his son, Kim Jong-un, as the DPRK has gotten ever closer to a 
fully-functioning nuclear weapon that could be transported through an ICBM. While the 
United States sought to deter North Korea’s nuclear development through the traditional 
theory of deterrence, it is evident that this approach has not been effective. While 
international efforts towards the denuclearization of the DPRK continue, it is important to 
understand the factors that have led to the re-invigorated desire for nuclear weapons 
capability and reasons for why denuclearization and deterrence continue to fail 
spectacularly. It is only by understanding that nuclear weapons in and of themselves do 
not work as effective coercive diplomacy as it had during the Cold War and the 
motivations of international actors as well as the DPRK that the international community 
could approach this issue more effectively.  
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The policy discussion concerning the United States and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has yet to provide a panacea for the North 
Korean nuclear crisis. Designing solutions for coping with the North Korean nuclear 
crisis that would reduce the risk of war on the Korean peninsula requires examining the 
deterrence strategies used, particularly when the United States and North Korea were 
exchanging threats of war up until 2017. By thoroughly analyzing what has unfolded 
between these nations over the past decade, we can better understand how deterrence 
holds on both sides—in the United States and in North Korea—and why the Korean 
peninsula is actually stable, even though the DPRK may be extremely close to being 
armed with nuclear weapons.  
 The two Koreas on the peninsula are still at war. The Korean War, which began in 
1950, has never formally ended. The Korean Armistice Agreement, signed in 1953, 
halted the war, but the peace treaty to officially end the war has yet to be signed by both 
parties.1 For more than six decades, the two nations—North Korea and the United 
States— have maintained their deterrence postures, specifically by leveraging 
brinkmanship strategies such as the exchange of constant threats. The brinkmanship 
strategy is likened to a game of chicken. In this scenario, two cars face each other and 
drive toward each other on a collision course. Each driver hopes the other will swerve. 
Yet if neither swerves, because each driver fears being labeled a “chicken,” they will 
collide and the result will be disastrous. Similarly, the United States and the DPRK 
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seemed to be trying to drive each other to the verge, each side risking a nuclear war for 
itself.   
The year 2017, in particular, was marked by the DPRK’s constant missile tests 
and President Trump and Kim Jong-un’s bloody war of words. Their adoption of nuclear 
brinkmanship strategies nearly resulted in pushing each other to the edge of the pit of 
raining “fire and fury.” Military options were even discussed at one point. In this time of 
mutual vulnerability, North Korea adopted a posture of asymmetric escalation, which 
involved responding to the entire spectrum of intensity of armed conflicts with the threat 
of nuclear weapon deployment.2 President Trump, meanwhile, maintained that “all 
options are on the table,” triggering an ongoing debate in the United States concerning 
the possibility of a bloody nose first strike on North Korea. Former National Security 
Advisor H.R. McMaster once held to the “least bad option” of a preventive or first strike 
by the United States against North Korea to solve the crisis, failing to recognize that a 
“limited strike” would not stay limited.3 In North Korea’s ICBM: A New Missile and a 
New Era, Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang maintain that this approach would “guarantee a 
nuclear war.”4 Similarly, Victor Cha and Katrin Fraser Katz, in The Right Way to Coerce 
North Korea, and Scott Sagan, in The Korean Missile Crisis, emphasize that a preemptive 
strike is a dangerous move that not only risks the lives of South Koreans and Japanese but 
those of Americans as well. 
                                                     
2 Narang, Vipin. “What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International 
Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 57, no. 3, Sept. 2012, pp. 478–508 
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 There were so many risky moments of hostility taken nearly to the edge that 
preemptive strikes were often discussed as a means of solving the problem. If the 
situation had escalated a bit further and misperceptions or miscommunications between 
the United States and North Korea had developed, a nuclear war would have been a likely 
outcome. Ultimately, however, a Korean war did not break out again, and a nuclear 
WWIII on the Korean peninsula did not materialize. Both nations understood each 
other’s threshold, or at least some advisors for both nations’ leaders were able to 
convince the leaders that military options were not worthwhile. Though they have 
actively employed the brinkmanship strategy throughout the years, driving toward each 
other without swerving, neither President Trump nor Kim Jong-un has carried out a 
preemptive strike.  
 That 66 years have passed without a nuclear war may demonstrate that deterrence 
does hold on both sides, North Korea and South Korea (under the U.S. umbrella). It could 
even be argued that the Korean peninsula is actually stable. The United States and North 
Korea both understand the costs of a nuclear war well enough to refrain from attacking 
each other. Rather than striving to win a nuclear war, which would be impossible, they 
both decided to keep the status quo in that they refrained from starting a nuclear war on 
the Korean peninsula. They also realized that they would not abruptly initiate a war in the 
absence of sufficient reason for doing so. The deterrence theory was effective, even for 
the most recent and most extreme conflicts between Kim Jong-un and President Trump. 
Some may point to the “madman theory,” which describes leaders making reckless 
decisions. However, although Kim Jong-un and President Trump often make reckless 




Brutality is not equivalent to irrationality. Both leaders are, at the least, rational enough to 
understand the consequences of a nuclear war. Thus, the notion of deterrence as a source 
of both threat and peace is evident in the cases of North Korea and the United States. 
 Nevertheless, traditional notions of deterrence fail when considering the long and 
storied history of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. Despite the strength and 
tenacity of the U.S. military power and projection in Northeast Asia, the DPRK under 
Kim Jong-un has not only failed to denuclearize but has indeed doubled its efforts to 
create a fully functioning nuclear weapon. Even after the summit between Kim and 
Trump, North Korea maintains its nuclear weapons development, as the most recent 
testing of an undisclosed weapon was announced by the state. The approach towards 
North Korea may be informed by other precedents in the history of nuclear proliferation 
and disarmament. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, countries that inherited nuclear 
stockpiles from the USSR(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), including Belarus and 
Ukraine, willingly or under international pressure gave up some of the largest stockpiles 
of nuclear weapons in the world and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), aimed at 
reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. Other countries, for their own 
reasons, dismantled their actual nuclear stockpiles, as in the case of South Africa, or 
relinquished their nuclear weapons program, as Libya did, to gain concessions from the 
international community, such as reducing economic sanctions placed against each 
respective country.  
 While such precedents may provide some hope for the denuclearization and 
disarmament of the DPRK, it is also important to note that many of these cases do not 




stockpiles were inherited from the USSR; moreover, the international consensus was that 
Ukraine did not have the know-how or capabilities to manage such stockpiles effectively, 
though recent scholarship suggests that Ukraine had better capabilities than previously 
believed.5 Nevertheless, Ukraine was provided with certain security assurances from 
Russia and the United States in exchange for giving up its nuclear arsenal and joining the 
NPT. With Libya, the state of nuclear weapons capability between Libya and the DPRK 
today is like night and day. Libya did not possess any actual nuclear weapons, although it 
was in the research and development process. However, in light of what happened to Iraq 
during the 2003 Iraq War and the continued sanctions levied against Libya, Muammar 
Qaddafi saw it in his best interests to cooperate with the West to end Libya’s nuclear 
program. Such a decision was driven by an internal motivation to approach the United 
States in secret to begin negotiations. Perhaps international pressure in the form of 
international sanctions may have chipped away at the Libyan government and forced it to 
disavow nuclear weapons, but the decision came from within. While the weapons 
capabilities are significantly different between Libya and the DPRK, it is important to 
note that the DPRK’s decision to dismantle its nuclear program and denuclearize will 
have to be an internal decision ultimately, much like in the Libyan case.   
 Perhaps the most congruent case to that of the DPRK may be South Africa’s 
denuclearization in 1989. By the time of its disarmament, South Africa had six 
Hiroshima-type nuclear bombs, even if it did not have missile technology to deliver them 
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over a long distance.6 Yet, much like Qaddafi’s choice to disarm, South Africa’s choice 
came from internal discussion and needs rather than solely on the influence of 
international actors. South Africa had already been dealing with international sanctions, 
in part because of its clandestine nuclear program but mostly due to the apartheid regime, 
which had been deemed racist and as a “crime against humanity” by the United Nations. 
Nevertheless, the decision for denuclearization came from the changing dynamics that led 
the South African government to deem nuclear weapons unnecessary for its national 
security interest. Prime among the change in dynamics was the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Without the threat to the South African regime from the international communist threat 
from the leftist governments in recently liberated Angola or the provision of 
independence to the formerly controlled region of Namibia, there was no need for nuclear 
weapons. Furthermore, for the South African government, its nuclear weapons were less 
for deterrence against the communist forces in Southern Africa and more a muted threat 
to the West and its former allies to come to South Africa’s aid in times of need against 
the communist threat to prevent a nuclear war. Thus, in applying the lessons from South 
Africa, it is important to note that getting the DPRK to relinquish its nuclear weapons 
program requires understanding the DPRK’s motivations for developing its nuclear 
weapons. By understanding such motivations and tackling these issues head on rather 
than just focusing on denuclearization directly would lead to a better result. Obviously 
the past and current approach in using deterrence and dealing with denuclearization 
without regard for the interests and needs of the DPRK has only led to impasse and 
stalemate.  
                                                     






 But the motivations of the DPRK in pursuing a nuclear weapons program are not 
so straight forward. South Africa’s motivations were multifaceted and dealt with a 
number of issues, including apartheid, international sanctions, internal conflict in the 
South African controlled area that was to become Namibia, and communist forces in 
Southern Africa. For North Korea, one of the major issues is also regime survival, much 
as it was for South Africa’s need to repel the threat posed by communist forces. Yet, 
many of the cases in which denuclearization and disarmament has occurred has left the 
DPRK wary of such recourse. Qaddafi’s decision to halt Libya’s nuclear weapons 
program could be seen as a warning to the Kim regime of what could happen after the 
loss of its own nuclear weapons program. After relinquishing its program in 2003, in the 
face of internal rebellion, international forces composed of U.S. and European troops 
intervened within the internal turmoil of the country, resulting in the capture, humiliation, 
and death of Qaddafi in 2011. If Libya still maintained its nuclear program, it could have 
potentially developed nuclear weapons. Such technology could have caused the United 
States and its allies to reconsider such a drastic response. Disarmament in the past has not 
helped stabilize and secure the disarmed nations’ sovereignty. Even in Ukraine, after 
giving up its nuclear arsenal, in 2014, Russia encroached upon Ukrainian territory of 
Crimea. Again, from the DPRK perspective, this result calls into question whether 
acquiescing to international pressures to denuclearize and dismantle its nuclear weapons 
would be the smartest choice. At best, it could open up and be accepted into the 
international community, like South Africa. At worst, it may just give the West and the 




regime, whether immediately as in the case of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein or eventually as 
evidenced by Qaddafi’s own demise.  
 The research and analysis provided by this paper shows that deterrence is a dated 
approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. The complexities of the DPRK’s motivations 
for state survival, among others, suggest that rather than forcing denuclearization through 
coercive diplomacy, such as indicating the U.S. own nuclear capabilities, addressing the 
issues that make North Korea consider nuclear weapons necessary will be key in 
negotiating greater concessions from the DPRK. While many other precedents of 
denuclearization and disarmament provide lessons to apply to the North Korean situation, 
it is also important to understand the differences and limitations among them; that is, a 
one-size fits all approach does not work. For example, in effect, deterrence fails 
particularly because of the credibility of the threat. To successfully use deterrence as a 
means of coercive diplomacy, the threatened state must believe the threat from its 
adversary credible before capitulating to its demands. However, the United States’ 
current track record is not good. Not only has it shown that it would invade or interfere in 
the affairs of countries that have disarmed or given up their program, any agreement on 
nuclear issues, such as that with Iran, may become null and void at the whim of the 
sitting president. Thus, the United States lacks credibility in this regard. Furthermore, if 
deterrence was going to make the DPRK capitulate, it would have done so long ago. 
Instead, the DPRK continues to violate United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions banning it from certain activities, along with other bilateral sanctions levied 




DPRK and the Kim regime, tests of weapons technology, missile, and nuclear technology 
continued unabated.   
Thus, this paper finds that deterrence has had little effect, if any, on preventing 
the DPRK from pursuing nuclear weapons development due to various factors, including 
the shifting perceptions of nuclear weapons and the interests and policies of major 
superpowers beyond the DPRK’s control. This paper explores the existing research on 
deterrence and potential reasons for why deterrence may have failed in the North Korean 
case (Chapter 1). Then, it examines the history of nuclear development in North Korea 
and the failure to prevent further nuclear development in the country, presenting the case 
study of South Africa as a potential source for lessons learned and application to the 
North Korean case (Chapter 2). The next section delves into understanding the 
mechanisms for why denuclearization in the DPRK failed (Chapter 3). Finally, this paper 





















Chapter 1: History of Nuclear Development in North Korea 
 
When the atomic bombs were detonated over the cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, bringing the Pacific theater of World War II to a close, the international 
community saw the devastation that could be wrought by nuclear weapons. But the 
existence of such power led to an arms race between the two superpowers following the 
war, the Soviet Union and the United States, adversaries in political ideology and world 
hegemony. Despite the power of these nuclear weapons and the tensions between the 
First World, allied with the United States, and the Second World, allied with the Soviet 
Union, nuclear weapons, while they existed in large stockpiles for both countries, were 
never used. In hindsight, these weapons created a situation where their existence led to a 
deterrence posture for both adversaries, allowing for relative stability. Thus, the fully-
functional nuclear arsenal that Kim Jong-un hopes to develop poses greater assets than 
the absolute power that these nuclear weapons could unleash against enemies of the 
North Korean state. Much like the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War, the pure existence of a nuclear arsenal could provide the country with protections 
beyond the actual use of such weapons. The following literature review considers how 
nuclear weapons could be used as a form of deterrence against other countries, but also 
how it could prevent countries like the DPRK from developing its own nuclear arsenal. 
Moreover, other scholars of denuclearization and deterrence also consider how deterrence 
may have failed, especially given the mechanisms that allow deterrence to work in the 






I.  Literature Review 
Deterrence has been a hallmark of United States foreign policy for much of the 
Cold War, where for nearly half a century, the former Soviet Union and the United States 
clashed in ideological difference yet only reached the brink of war without any direct 
armed conflict. During the Cold War, U.S. deterrence focused on two specific missions: 
“deterrence of nuclear attack (by threatening swift, effective retaliation), and deterrence 
against overwhelming conventional attack against North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) countries by the Warsaw Pact.”7 While this period was marked by a nuclear 
arms race that presented an imminent threat to both the United States and the Soviet 
Union, a nuclear holocaust resulting from a nuclear war never manifested, supporting the 
idea that deterrence was a source of both threat and peace. Although the Cold War may 
long be over, the United States still upholds the idea of nuclear deterrence in its strategic 
policy. However, its priorities have slightly shifted where its first mission of deterring 
nuclear attack has come to also include other weapons of mass destruction.8 
As a mode of coercive diplomacy, deterrence uses the threat of force to compel an 
adversary to reconsider potential actions that where the benefits would no longer 
outweigh the costs. Thomas Schelling (1977) suggests that deterrence has brought about 
“relative international peace”—meaning the absence of nuclear detonations and, thus, 
nuclear war—in the midst of the nuclear standoff of the twentieth century. With the 
advent of nuclear weapons and increasingly destructive military technology, the potential 
for destruction now encompass the complete annihilation of humanity, not just cities or 
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nations. As a result, this effect provides the most powerful and absolute bargaining chip. 
“Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy”; the “diplomacy of violence” 
and the threat of its infliction through such weapons are more effective military 
strategies.9 In this view, the stakes are now very much different. With the potential for 
complete annihilation from the face of the earth, the use of nuclear weapons or the 
possibility of its use created a situation for higher stakes. It wasn’t the victor and the loser 
in the aftermath of such war, it would be victor and no one else, as nuclear weapons, seen 
in the wake of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nothing of the losers would remain. Yet 
because of its destructive capabilities not just set against a specific target, whether that be 
an individual, a city, or a state, but against all of humanity that allowed for nuclear 
deterrence to prevent a nuclear war. Again, the stakes were much higher when it came to 
the use of nuclear weapons. By studying the distinction between the use of force as either 
an act of detonation or a form of threat, we can begin to understand why the doctrine of 
mutually assured destruction (MAD) prevented nuclear war. Deterrence is most potent 
with the threat of use rather than the act itself. In the case of the latter, the adversary 
would then have nothing to lose. Thus, “violence is most purposeful and most successful 
when it is threatened and not used.”10 Nevertheless, this threat of use must be credible 
and clearly communicated to the adversary in order for deterrence to be effective. 
Without this prerequisite, the adversary would not understand what is at stake and 
therefore would probably not react the way that was intended by the nuclear power.  
 Yet, other scholars have criticized Schelling’s position that the threat of force and 
the potential for mutually assured destruction allows for greater stability and peace. 
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Robert Jervis (1989) questions whether the threat of nuclear war makes the world more 
secure. Jervis believes, as does Schelling, that “military victory is no longer possible in a 
war between the superpowers.”11 During the Cold War, the nuclear arsenals of the United 
States and Russia did not differ substantially. As it stands today, the difference between 
the United States and Russia, the successor state of the Soviet Union, in terms of the size 
of their respective nuclear arsenals is not very large. However, both nuclear powers stand 
ahead of the next largest nuclear power, France with about 300 nuclear weapons, and 
China, with about 270. These arsenal pale in comparison to Russia’s approximately 6,800 
and the U.S. 6,550.12 Even today, both the United States and Russia stand head above 
water over the next largest nuclear power, France and China. However, the existence and 
capabilities of nuclear weapons pose a contradictory dichotomy between annihilation and 
peace. Jervis criticizes Schelling’s simplistic yes/no take on real-world application of the 
theory: states should not simply resort to threatening their adversaries with nuclear attack 
as a means of deterrence, for having “more nuclear capabilities” does little to influence 
the behavior of countries that already have nuclear technology.13 Looking at the state of 
international security, this largely seems to be the case. Going back to the idea of 
mutually assured destruction, having a few nuclear weapons versus one in the thousands 
does little to deter countries with nuclear capabilities. This comes about as having one 
nuclear weapon is strong enough for annihilation, where an arsenal would not be 
necessary. When it comes to dealing with the DPRK, this seems to be true. Even when 
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the Trump administration antagonized North Korea for its latest nuclear tests and the 
further development of its nuclear program, Kim Jong-un did not kowtow in light of the 
large nuclear arsenal of the United States. Rather, he pushed Trump into escalating his 
war of words, even amounting to threatening the U.S. territory of Guam. For Jervis, 
deterrence theory has its limitations, as nuclear deterrence cannot in and of itself bring 
about world peace. 
Moreover, the limitations of deterrence extend further beyond whether states 
possess nuclear weapons. The efficacy of nuclear capabilities as a deterrence depends on 
communication – whether the target of such policies understand the threat as such. Robert 
Jervis, Richard Lebow, and Janice Stein (1985) acknowledge the importance of making 
credible commitments. The mere possession of nuclear weapons and the ability to deploy 
them are not enough to be deterrents in and of themselves. For nuclear weapons to have 
effective results, there needs to be a credible policy, where it would make sense from the 
adversary’s point of view that nuclear weapons use would be warranted. Expert on 
nuclear deterrence for the Submarine Industrial Base Council (SIBC), Frank Miller 
stipulates certain conditions that lead to a credible declaratory policy:  
Nuclear responses are credible when linked directly to the defense of a nation’s 
vital interests and territorial integrity and, where undergirded by treaties and decades of 
demonstrated commitment, to the defense of allies’ vital interests and territorial integrity. 
A potential adversary who comes to believe that a deterrent has been linked to the 
defense of something which is not worth risking national survival through the military 
employment of nuclear weapons is likely to test that proposition.14 
 
According to this idea, the adversary must believe that a country will be willing to use 
nuclear arms for that particular situation. With regard to the United States and North 
Korea, however, this credibility is called into question. It is obvious that the United States 
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can use overwhelming power against North Korea, a shock and awe tactic used against 
Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War. However, North Korea also calls into question the 
credibility of the United States to deploy such weapons, especially given the 
repercussions of such actions, vis-à-vis China and Russia, countries that closely border 
North Korea. Thus, the adversary, in this case North Korea, does not believe that the 
United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons against the country because of 
certain international norms and its hesitance to alter its relationships with both China and 
Russia. This may go as so far to explain, at least partly, why deterrence has failed in 
preventing Kim Jong-un from dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program.  
Furthermore, while having a credible nuclear threat is important in deterrence, 
Jervis, Lebow, and Stein emphasize the difficulty of understanding and communicating 
signals: Distinctions that seem obvious to the sender might be confusing or opaque to the 
receiver. What’s more, signals are sometimes incompletely received, particularly when 
sent during dramatic events and/or when its recipient fails to understand the context.15 
Jervis (1988) notes in War and Misperception that “although war can occur even when 
both sides see each other accurately, misperception often plays a larger role. Particularly 
interesting are judgments and misjudgments of another state’s intention.”16 Even with the 
advancement in communication technology and openness of the Internet and information, 
such miscommunication is prevalent. One only needs to see the escalation of words 
between Kim and Trump to see how true this could be. While the joint United States and 
South Korean military drills held every year shows a clear message to North Korea, the 
escalation of such drills could be seen by the Kim regime as a greater than was initially 
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intended, creating a more tense situation that could lead to greater brinkmanship. On the 
other hand, the lack of assertive action against the DPRK given its violation of UN 
Security Council resolution might suggest that the international community may not 
actually be against its nuclear program, which may not be the actual case. 
Miscommunication leads to undermining deterrence while it could also unnecessarily 
escalate tensions toward war. Thus, a deterrence strategy carries a possibility of failure 
just like any other foreign policy options, with misperceptions being a primary reason.  
Yet, it is important to note that nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence does not 
have a one size fits all effect. There are differing situations and thus differing degrees to 
which nuclear weapons could be used for deterrence. Taking a look at deterrence among 
nuclear powers, Vipin Narang (2012) challenges the notion of existential bias as in an era 
of regional nuclear powers, the “superpower deterrence equation is nearly irrelevant to all 
other nuclear powers.”17 In other words, the mere existence of nuclear weapons is no 
longer enough to prevent conflicts. Narang examines the experiences of nuclear states 
and analyzes their attitudes in regards to these capabilities, categorizing them into three 
categories: catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation. Among these options, 
asymmetric escalation is the most aggressive option where states are able to express the 
intention, along with the credible capability, to use nuclear weapons in a tactical setting 
on an adversary’s conventional forces. To achieve credibility, a nation must be 
transparent regarding its “capabilities, deployment patterns, and conditions of use.”18 
Such an attitude defuses conflicts at both a low and high level of violence against both 
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nuclear and non-nuclear states. Thus, he concludes that nuclear weapons exert varying 
levels of deterrence according to a state’s nuclear posture. 
Moreover, even while nuclear weapons could compel restraint given the 
possibility of mutually assured destruction and complete annihilation, conventional 
weapons still create an environment of instability that could lead to the brink of nuclear 
war. Through examining conflicts armed with both nuclear and conventional weapons, 
Barry R. Posen (1992) challenges early limited war theorists by maintaining that large-
scale conventional conflicts can “inadvertently” escalate to the point of nuclear war.19 In 
his view, intentional actions could unintentionally be escalatory in nature. 
Acknowledging that “no examples of such escalation” exist (as there have been no 
nuclear wars to date), he turns to the NATO–Warsaw Pact arms race of the 1980s, laying 
out possible scenarios that would have been ripe for nuclear escalation.20 During much of 
the Cold War, escalation between the two global superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union were in constant competition and conflict, even on the European continent. 
Those that allied themselves with the United States and sought protection under the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella were part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. In 
response, the Soviet Union created its own military alliance under the Warsaw Pact, 
where its satellite states were under its own nuclear umbrella. In effect, the tensions in 
Europe were constantly on high alert due to the proximity of the Soviet Union and the 
vigilance paid both to NATO and to the Warsaw Pact, especially with regards to the 
development of improved weapons. While he does explore this idea of intentional actions 
leading to unintentional escalation, Posen also considers incidental conventional attacks 
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on nuclear forces rather than accidental or deliberate attacks on nuclear weapons.21 Such 
an idea still remains a potent threat for the Soviet Union’s successor state of Russia. 
According to Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine, “nuclear weapons will remain an 
important factor for preventing the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military 
conflicts involving the use of conventional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional 
war).”22 While there is retaliation for a potential nuclear attack, Russia’s military strategy 
also considers where the use of nuclear weapons could arise from a threat initiated by 
conventional weapons. Therefore, it is significant in the study of denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsula to be aware that conventional weapons, used as intentional actions, 
could lead to a situation where nuclear weapons could be used as a tool.  
 Such escalation, Posen argues, arises from the security dilemma, the nature of 
military organizations, and the “fog of war.” The security dilemma arises as states build 
up their arsenals and capabilities from the perception that their adversaries are doing so as 
well. This creates a situation that leads to the escalation of tensions due to an arms race. 
Any advancement in military or weapons technology inherently threatens the security of 
its adversary by the very fact that such technology could render the adversary’s weapons 
obsolete or overpower the adversary’s own forces. Thus, in such an event, an arms race 
ensues, and has so in the past during the Cold War as seen during the nuclear arms race 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, this is all the more potent, as 
North Korea considers its own nuclear weapons programs as a necessity for the sake of 
its security against aggressors, including the United States. Moreover, military 
organizations tend to have a “proclivity for offensive operations,” and they generally seek 
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autonomy from outside interventions in military planning and execution, an orientation 
that can create an environment ripe for escalation. Third and last, Posen borrows 
Clausewitz’s notion of the “fog of war” to explain the causes of inadvertent escalation, 
noting that difficulties encountered when gathering and seeking to interpret critical 
information during a conventional conflict may increase the possibility of inadvertent 
escalation.23 This also relates back to the idea of perception and misperception detailed 
by Jervis.  
 With the use of conventional weapons in escalating conflicts, there is some doubt 
on the use of nuclear weapons as a method of coercion. Todd Sechser and Matthew 
Fuhrmann (2017) goes as far as challenging the notion of the “nuclear coercionist” school 
as professed by Schelling. They maintain that the coercive advantages gained from 
nuclear weapons are minimal, especially when given the analysis of 200 cases of 
militarized compellent threats made between 1918 to 2001.24 Focusing on the 23 cases of 
military confrontations within seven different territorial disputes, Sechser and Fuhrmann 
conclude that in comparison to their non-nuclear counterparts, nuclear weapons do not 
have “additional compellent leverage beyond what is already afforded by their 
conventional capabilities.”25 Sechser and Fuhrmann recognize that nuclear weapons lack 
credibility due to the mutually destructive nature of the weapons once detonated while 
coercive diplomacy could be pursued through conventional weapons; thereby rendering 
nuclear weapons redundant.26  
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This notion that conventional weapons are just as effective as nuclear weapons in 
deterrence is echoed by Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press (2017) who recognize the 
advent of a new era in which nuclear weapons are no longer the ultimate instrument of 
deterrence.27 In addition to both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, they contend that 
even conventional weapons can destroy most types of counterforce targets. For South 
Korea, this is true. While North Korea’s potential nuclear weapons could wreak massive 
casualties and destruction to the ROK(Republic of Korea), the use of conventional 
weapons would just as easily deliver such a result. Moreover, the United States has the 
potential to destroy the DPRK, not with nuclear weapons, but by the simple use of 
conventional weapons given its bases located in the region (South Korea and Japan) as 
well as its fleet in the Pacific. In the past, as was shown with an inimical leader, the 
United States has shown that it could just as easily depose and undermine a country with 
incredible speed, seen in the 2003 Iraq War.  
To survive in a world that is more vulnerable than ever before thanks to the 
technological advancement of highly accurate weapons, it is critical that nations improve 
their retaliatory arsenals to “thwart advanced sensor and strike systems.”28 Thus, 
according to Sechser and Fuhrmann, the main value of nuclear weapons lies in self-
defense rather than coercion. This is made all too aware to the United States, as during 
the Obama administration, the Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 declared that nuclear 
weapons were mainly to deter nuclear attack against the United States while conventional 
weapons would be strengthened so that nuclear weapons would only be used as a self-
defensive deterrence tool. Outlined in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, for NATO, 
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“deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, 
remains a core element of our overall strategy… The circumstances in which any use of 
nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.”29 Moreover, 
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg affirmed that NATO’s nuclear strategy of 
being in a nuclear alliance was purely based on that of political deterrence rather than its 
use as a military option during the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, Poland.30  
 It is under such context that this paper analyzes the efficacy of deterrence as a tool 
to contain and control the nuclear development of the DPRK. During the Cold War era, 
the deterrence posture may have seemed effective in lowering the possibility for nuclear 
war, evidenced by the lack of such war. Nevertheless, nuclear deterrence still does carry a 
high risk of war when combined with the possibility of miscommunication and 
inadvertent escalation. Throughout the post-Cold War period, such tensions have waxed 
and waned on the Korean peninsula, with the recent escalations pointing to the inefficacy 
of the deterrence policies of the past. However, such escalations and brinkmanship may 
arise because of the lack of credibility given the mutually assured destruction as 
supported by Sechser and Fuhrmann, or the fact that conventional weapons have the 
exact same potency, which is a fact that the ROK understands at a deeper level, given the 
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II. The Beginnings of North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions 
Nuclear ambitions in the DPRK began almost immediately after its inception. 
Following the devastating Korean War, which lasted between 1950 – 1953, pitting 
Koreans against each other in a proxy war between the Soviet Union, supporting the 
north, and the United States, backing the south. Understanding this dynamic, North 
Korean leader Kim Il Sung established the Atomic Energy Research Institute and the 
Academy of Sciences in 1952 to protect his new state from foreign forces, particularly 
the United States.31 However, North Korea’s pursuit of knowledge concerning nuclear 
weapons found little traction until 1955, when members of the DPRK’s Academy of 
Sciences attended a nuclear energy conference in Moscow. The following year, North 
Korea signed an agreement with the Soviet Union’s Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, 
and North Korean scientists were soon sent to Soviet Union for training.32 In 1959, North 
Korea and Soviet Union agreed to establish a nuclear research center in the DPRK under 
the code name “The Furniture Factory.” The research center was located only eight 
kilometers from Yongbyon, what was to become one of North Korea’s major nuclear 
facilities. The construction of Yongbyon’s “furniture factory” also included the 
installation of a Soviet IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor.33 With the assistance of the 
Soviet Union, North Korea was able to jump-start its nuclear weapons program to secure 
the regime by countering other nations, especially the United States. 
 The major expansion of North Korea’s nuclear program came in the 1980s. From 
1984 to 1986, Pyongyang built a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated nuclear reactor for 
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plutonium production. More reactors and a reprocessing plant followed during the latter 
part of the 1980s. On the international front, North Korea signed the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985 under the agreement that the Soviet 
Union would construct a light-water reactor (LWR) capable of generating 1,760 
megawatts of electricity.34 However, North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003, 
reversing its former policies as it went on to conduct underground nuclear testing that 
started in 2006 and continued through 2017.35 
 North Korea began to see nuclear weapons as a means of security assurance in the 
1950s, and the collapse of the USSR only served to strengthen North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions. Initially with the assistance from the Soviet Union, North Korea began to 
develop the scientific know-how in nuclear technology necessary to protect itself from 
foreign threats, primarily the United States during the Cold War. The necessity of 
securing itself through nuclear technology was only further entrenched with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. As one of the few allies of the DPRK, the dissolution of 
Soviet Union and the end of communist rule in that nation alarmed North Korea. Surely 
the DPRK had to remain vigilant if a large and powerful country such as the Soviet 
Union could succumb to the pressures of the West, particularly the United States. Since 
that time, North Korea has further perceived the necessity to pursue its own protection to 
maintain the regime, particularly as North Korea has become a “shrimp” between another 
pair of global powers, China and the United States.  
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III. Current Nuclear Capabilities 
The era of nuclear development in North Korea entered a new phase as Kim Jong-un 
came into power in 2011 after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-un’s long-
held ambitions for the DPRK’s nuclear expansion ultimately led the country to last year’s 
successful test of an ICBM that could reach the U.S. mainland, and North Korea is now 
probably only “a few tests away” from being completely capable of launching such a 
missile. Moreover, the year 2017, in particular, was marked by the DPRK’s constant 
missile tests and President Trump and Kim Jong-un’s bloody war of words. Their 
adoption of nuclear brinkmanship strategies nearly resulted in their pushing each other to 
the edge of the pit of raining “fire and fury.” Military options were even discussed at one 
point. In this time of mutual vulnerability, North Korea adopted a posture of asymmetric 
escalation, which involved responding to the entire spectrum of intensity of armed 
conflicts with the threat of nuclear weapon deployment.36 
However, an inescapable uncertainty clouds any discussion of North Korea’s progress 
toward developing truly deployable WMDs. Because of the closed-off nature of North 
Korean society, an accurate assessment of Pyongyang’s present capabilities is a nigh-
impossible task. Accordingly, the outside world must base its knowledge on scraps of 
information gleaned from North Korean domestic news reports—the reliability of which 
is unknown, and which often report evident test failures as unverifiable successes when 
conducted underground. However, another method exists by which other nations could at 
least measure the breadth of the North Korean nuclear test explosions and estimate that 
country’s current nuclear capability: seismic monitoring to measure explosive yields from 
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the tests. As indicated in Table 1, the estimated yields from the most recent DPRK tests 
have grown exponentially from those produced by its first attempt.  
Table. 1: North Korean Nuclear Test Yields Comparison 
 
According to the articles published by CNN and Washington Post, the estimated 
yield for the DPRK’s sixth nuclear test was approximately more than ten times the level 
of Hiroshima bombing in 1945.37 Although many experts dismiss North Korea’s claims 
of being able to test a hydrogen bomb, the DPRK’s latest nuclear detonation was 
undoubtedly its strongest so far, constituting an unmistakable warning of North Korea’s 
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progress in creating nuclear technology.38 Even in the midst of the DPRK’s constant 
ballistic missile tests, little means exists by which to accurately verify that country’s 
claim of being able to produce miniaturized nuclear warheads that are possessed of 
reentry capabilities. However, even amid this uncertainty, we cannot ignore North 
Korea’s potential for mass destruction. Numerous news media outlets and experts on 
North Korea have speculated that North Korea still has not perfectly produced 
functioning nuclear warheads and ballistic missile technology, but even so, the DPRK is 
apparently progressing toward its goal of using rocket technology to deliver WMDs. 
There is considerable concern resulting from North Korea’s progress, where UN Security 
Council sanctions and unilateral sanctions imposed by several countries have been futile 
in deterring Kim Jong-un from continuing his progress on creating a fully-functional and 
deliverable nuclear weapon. 
The plausible window for denial has long since passed: Pyongyang is no longer 
far removed from perfecting its nuclear capabilities. Accordingly, an in-depth analysis of 
the factors that have contributed to the North Korean nuclear impasse can provide 
information crucial for addressing and solving one of the 21st century’s gravest 
existential threats to peace and security. In short, if the regime were to launch an actual 
nuclear missile, the consequences of doing so would be extremely destructive, even more 
so than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing by the United States in 1945. The DPRK 
has long striven to develop its own nuclear weapons, and thus has invested an 
astronomical volume of resources into developing this capability. In particular, Kim 
                                                     
38 Lee, Michelle. “North Korea Nuclear Test May Have Been Twice as Strong as First Thought.” The 







Jong-un has firmly held to a belief that nuclear weapons were the ultimate measure that 
ensures the survival of his regime, —and thus his survival—once even proclaiming 
publicly on state media that the weapons are a “powerful deterrent that guarantees its 
sovereignty.”39 
However, important in the analysis of the DPRK’s nuclear program is its 
conventional capabilities developing alongside its nuclear weapons technology. This is 
no surprise given the central role the military plays within the state and its military-first 
policy known as Songun Chongch’i. As a result, the DPRK’s military has taken 
precedence, where the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is a top priority in any state 
decisions, whether domestic or international. Moreover, much of the population is 
involved in some form or another with the military. Although the population of the 
United States is 13 times larger than that of North Korea, the latter’s total military 
personnel more than triples that of the States (Table 2.2). Men in North Korea are 
universally conscripted, while women undergo a selective conscription process. The 
usual length of service is around 10 years, starting at the age of 17.  
 While the DPRK may have more military personnel and a force peopled through 
compulsory universal male conscription, the country largely lacks the resources of the 
United States. In short, its numbers do not equate to the military capability. For example, 
the United States has 13 times as many military aircrafts as North Korea. Furthermore, 
while the former does have a greater number of naval assets, however, with 967 against 
the U.S. 415, it lacks the presence, or otherwise, of an aircraft carrier. Aircraft carriers 
function as seagoing airbases, which usually measure from 500 to 1000 ft long. The 
                                                     






aircraft carrier “remains a nation’s ‘symbol of strength’ and the U.S. Navy remains the 
clear leader in the field with its powerful nuclear-fueled fleet as well as its conventional-
powered inventory.”40 Moreover, North Korea’s military capability is largely limited, 
particularly because of its antiquated equipment. The Congressional Research Service 
report, published in November 2017, maintains that although North Korea is “the fourth-
largest military in the world, it has some significant deficiencies particularly with respect 
to training and aging (if not archaic) equipment.”41 
Table 2.1: Military Capability Comparison: North Korea and the United States42 
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In an effort to compensate for such a military handicap, Pyongyang has been 
adopting asymmetric capabilities. This would include not only chemical and biological 
weapons, but also capabilities for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Asymmetric 
warfare is an approach by which the army’s leaders try to “circumvent or undermine 
military strength while exploiting their weaknesses, using methods that differ 
significantly from the expected method of operations.”43 As previously discussed, the 
effect of the security dilemma results in countries pouring resources into military and 
weapons technology in an effort to strengthen its position vis-à-vis its adversary. For 
North Korea, this adversary is clearly the United States and its allies, including South 
Korea. Realizing that its own military capabilities is unable to compete directly with that 
of the United States, it makes sense that asymmetric capabilities could provide North 
Korea with assurances given its weakness in other areas of its military potency. Such 
asymmetric capabilities are not only a concern where they may be used against targets 
deemed necessary by the DPRK, but also in terms of international trade, where the DPRK 
may be willing to export and exchange information and technology with other pariah 
states, terrorist organizations, or other non-state actors who may be considered threats to 









                                                     





Chapter 2: The Failure to Dismantle North Korea’s Nuclear Program 
I. North Korean Nuclear Program Forges On 
The DPRK’s nuclear weapons program poses a potential existential threat to its 
nearest neighbors, such as South Korea and Japan, and indeed to the entire global 
community. Two decades of mostly U.S.-led international attempts to solve the North 
Korean nuclear crisis have resulted in abrupt twists and turns. Nearly all possible 
approaches—both carrots and sticks—have been adopted by the international community 
to curb the isolated nation’s nuclear ambitions. Yet, even the recent landmark summit 
between the United States and North Korean leaders in June 2018 has not provided any 
tangible progress toward the denuclearization of Pyongyang and may have only 
complicated the issue. Such impasses, particularly of United States-foreign policy on the 
Korean peninsula, raise the following question: Does a solution to breaking the nuclear 
deadlock even exist?  
Efforts toward denuclearization and non-proliferation on nuclear weapons had 
been made, but to no avail. The DPRK joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
1985, agreeing to prevent the spread and development of nuclear weapons and weapons 
technology with the ultimate goal of disarmament.44 However, joining this treaty did not 
mean that the DPRK would play by the rules set forth by the international community. In 
fact, the NPT became a bargaining tool for the North Korean regime to extract benefits 
from the international community. Threatening to withdraw from the NPT, the United 
States and the DPRK signed the Agreed Framework in 1994, where the DPRK gained 
concessions of international foreign aid and normalizing United States-DPRK relations in 
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exchange for halting its plutonium weapons program.45 Nevertheless, this approach soon 
faltered as the DPRK withdrew from the NPT, after the Bush administration declared the 
state part of the “axis of evil.” The DPRK announced in January 2003 its withdrawal 
from the NPT, claiming that “the withdrawal from the NPT is a legitimate self-defensive 
measure taken against the U.S. moves to stifle the DPRK and the unreasonable behavior 
of the IAEAA following the U.S.”46 Thus, for the DPRK, perceived hostility against the 
country in the form of both U.S. rhetoric and the IAEA investigations propelled North 
Korea from abandoning this international mechanism that would have placed greater 
checks on its nuclear development.  
In line with the NPT, North Korea had also been involved in the Six Party Talks, 
among North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia. Initiated 
in August 2003, the Six Party Talks allowed for a forum in which the six nations could 
come to an agreement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Certain progress 
was made through this mechanism. In 2005, following the fourth round of talks, the 
DPRK “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and 
returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to 
IAEA safeguards” while the Six Parties in general reaffirmed the “verifiable 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.”47 Following this 
development, the subsequent rounds of the Six Party Talks in 2007 led to more progress 
on denuclearization, where the Parties began to work on a roadmap on the 
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implementation of the ideas set forth in 2005. Among the agreements made in 2007 were 
declarations that North Korea would commence the dismantling of its nuclear programs 
by the end of the year, starting with the Yongbyon facilities, declare all its nuclear 
capabilities and prevent any transfer of material or knowledge of nuclear weapons 
abroad.48  
Nevertheless, much like the NPT, the Six Party Talks eventually hit a stalemate as 
the DPRK refused to return to the talks in 2009. While progress seemed to be going 
forward, the reality was that nothing was really being done. The talks hit an impasse with 
U.S. restrictions on Banco Delta Asia, where the DPRK held fifty accounts, which 
resulted in increased DPRK provocations, namely a long-range rocket testing and an 
underground nuclear test in 2006. However, returning to the talks, the DPRK began 
making certain concessions, such as the details of its dismantling of Yongbyon, but 
ultimately it failed to agree to a verification protocol, which strained its relations with the 
United States. By the end of 2008, the DPRK reneged on its initial agreement and began 
its program, refusing to let international inspectors into the country.49 Ultimately, the Six 
Party Talks had failed. This may also be due to the impasse created by the conditions 
from the United States and South Korea that the DPRK had to show signs that it was 
committed to denuclearization, while the DPRK wanted talks without conditions or 
stipulations.  
Since the failure of the Six Party Talks and Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power 
in 2011, the DPRK has doubled its efforts on nuclear technology, specifically on the 
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development of nuclear weapons technology. North Korea carried out the launch of its 
largest and most powerful ballistic missile, the Hwasong-15 late in 2017. The idea that its 
weapons were now capable of hitting the U.S. mainland came as a surprise to many as the 
international community had largely underestimated North Korea’s willingness and its 
capacity to pursue such a goal in a relatively short amount of time. Many scholars in the 
field have recognized that Pyongyang’s most recent ICBM test as indeed successful, 
unlike previous attempts in the earlier developmental stages of the country’s nuclear 
program. Vipin Narang has also supported the claim that the DPRK’s launch was 
successful via his personal social media account, claiming, “It is real.”50 Kim Jong-un 
was able to recognize the immense deterrent power of nuclear weapons in the early days 
of his rule—perhaps even before truly consolidating his power among the North Korean 
political elite.  
 
II. The U.S. Response to North Korean Denuclearization 
Given American hegemony during the late 20th and early 21st century, the United 
States would seem to have the answer to solving the North Korean nuclear crisis—or at 
least that it has the upper hand, allowing it to manage the issue to suit its own interests. 
Since the early 2000s, the United States has adopted what the Obama administration 
called the “Strategic Patience” policy in regard to North Korea, whereby the United 
States declines to engage with North Korea until the DPRK demonstrates “positive, 
constructive behavior and a genuine willingness to negotiate.”51 According to this 
strategy, the United States has ignored North Korea except to levy harsh sanctions, 
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waiting for the DPRK to denuclearize. The Obama administration’s hardline policy was 
especially evident in UNSC decisions and sanctions against North Korea—yet many have 
objected that a policy of “Strategic Patience” merely masks an undue passiveness in 
resolving this urgent issue. This has been evident in the positioning taken by the United 
States and its ally, South Korea, in taking the hardline position of having the DPRK 
provide a demonstrable willingness to give up its nuclear program before resuming the 
Six Party Talks.   
 The Trump administration has also taken a similarly tough stance, insisting that 
the United States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear state. Yet amid a swell of 
public opinion fearing U.S. military action against Pyongyang, the Trump administration 
claimed that the United States is seeking neither regime change nor regime collapse in 
North Korea.52 The slogan advises “maximum pressure and engagement,” seeking 
thereby to correct the previous administration’s failure to solve the problem while 
ensuring its neighboring countries of a low possibility of a war.53 It appears, at least on 
the surface, that the United States’ ultimate goal on the North Korean issue is the 
denuclearization of the DPRK so as to secure regional and global peace. The number one 
priority remains the denuclearization and the dismantling of the DPRK’s nuclear 
weapons program rather than a regime collapse. Although any attempt to judge the 
performance of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure and engagement” policy 
would be premature at this juncture, it could easily become another “failed” foreign 
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policy attempt to solve the North Korean nuclear impasse to denuclearize the isolated 
nation.  
As the tension between the DPRK and the United States increased and the war of 
words continued to heat up between DPRK’s Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Trump, 
talks of denuclearization was still not completely dead. As the escalation between the two 
leaders subsided, both Kim and Trump met in Singapore in June 2018 on not only United 
States-DPRK relations, but also on the important topic of denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsula. To alleviate the pressures felt by the DPRK from the United States, Trump had 
agreed on certain security guarantees while Kim “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering 
commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”54 Despite this 
outward progress on the issue, the actual denuclearization and disarmament of the DPRK 
remains to be seen. Speaking after the Singapore summit in the summer of 2018, U.S. 
Defense Secretary James Mattis noted a lack of clear indication that North Korea would 
indeed denuclearize and was skeptical that such negotiation would even commence at 
that point.55 This outlook seems to have come into fruition as the DPRK has returned to 
its old habits within a few months of the Singapore summit. While it seems that the test 
was not of a nuclear device or a long-range missile, the DPRK announced on November 
16, 2018 that it had successfully test a “newly developed ultramodern tactical weapon.”56 
Thus, while denuclearization may not be completely off the table, given continued albeit 
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stalled bilateral discussions with the United States, the DPRK continues to bolster its 
weapons development program. 
 
III. China’s Response to North Korean Denuclearization 
 However, the United States is not solely to blame for the lack of progress on the 
denuclearization of North Korea. China remains a key lifeline to the hermit nation, and as 
such faces equal pressure from the international community whenever violations of 
UNSC sanctions are brought to light by very evident provocations. Nevertheless, direct 
and assertive pressures from China have not materialized. Rather the North Korean 
gridlock has continued, and so will the blaming game, with the United States and China 
arguing about who is more accountable for the North Korean nuclear impasse: Whenever 
tensions escalate on the Korean peninsula, China blames the United States, who is 
“supposed” to discharge certain duties as a leader in solving global security problems. 
Such a sound argument seems more relevant when applied to South Korea, of which the 
United States is an ally and protector. The United States, for its part, promulgates the 
“China responsibility theory,” which asserts that China should put greater pressure on 
North Korea.57 Because China has relatively close economic and diplomatic ties with the 
DPRK, the international community, and particularly the United States, takes the view 
that the PRC could help restrain North Korea by imposing sanctions and so isolating the 
DPRK from the global arena as to make it cease its provocations. 
 While the United States may consider China has having a very real and influential 
role in curbing North Korea, the reality may be that the relationship between the DPRK 
                                                     





and China may be significantly different than in the past. It is certainly true that China 
and the DPRK shared a special relationship in the past, especially as some of the few 
communist countries on the Asian mainland. This was evident in the close political 
relationships during the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il eras, but also during many of the 
multilateral meetings regarding the DPRK, where China acted as a buffer to protect the 
DPRK, given its power as one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). During this time, China did not act towards the DPRK without regard 
to the DPRK’s flagrant disregard for international sanctions and norms. Following the 
first nuclear test in 2006, while the UNSC imposed unanimous sanctions against the 
country, China condemned the acts and called for the DPRK to “stop all the activities that 
might further de-stabilize the region, and back to the Six Party Talks.”58 Even after the 
bigger test in 2009, coupled with the DPRK’s abandonment of the Six Party Talks 
altogether, China continued its assertive tone, unanimously adopted further sanctions 
against the DPRK including the search of North Korean cargo ships, as part of the 
UNSC. Although China saw the DPRK’s actions as a disregard for international norms 
and objectives, China’s ambassador to the UN at the time, Zhang Yesui, emphasized that 
diplomatic means rather than coercive force should be used in dealing with the DPRK, 
not just economic sanctions that could affect the humanitarian assistance or development 
of the country.59  Yet, even with Chinese pressure on the DPRK, noticeable changes did 
not take place. This could be due to China’s actions against the DPRK being seen as 
watered down rather than an aggressive stance that would drive a wedge between the two 
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countries, especially as China had a strategic interest in upholding the DPRK, an issue 
that will be discussed in greater length in the following chapter.  
 However, it is important to note that the relationship between the DPRK and 
China has shifted since Kim Jong-il. With the ascendancy of Kim Jong-un, the 
relationship between China and North Korea was drastically and unexpectedly altered 
with the execution of Kim’s uncle, Jang Song-thaek in 2013. Jang had previously been 
integral in the DPRK’s link to China, having been a key figure in helping bridge ties 
between the DPRK during Kim Jong-il’s rule and China, in addition to the China-backed 
reforms to revitalize the DPRK economy. With the loss of Jang, expert on northeast 
Asian security at the University of Sydney Jingdong Yuan suggests that “this is not a 
welcome development as far as China is concerned.”60 At the moment of Jang’s 
execution, the bilateral relationship between China and the DPRK was already on shaky 
ground, given the lack of bilateral visits made between China and the DPRK, unlike that 
of Kim Jong-il’s regime. This episode certainly strengthened the view of China’s losing 
grip on the DPRK, as Kim Jong-un continued to engage in missile launches and nuclear 
test without regard to China’s condemnation or pressure, leading to the stricter stance 
taken by China with regard to the UNSC sanctions against the country.61 This was made 
evident in the aftermath of the February 2013 tests, where China went as far as to contact 
the North Korean ambassador regarding the test, an unprecedented move by the Chinese. 
Nevertheless, such actions went unheeded as the DPRK continued to test its nuclear and 
weapons capabilities, such as during January 2016, its fourth nuclear test, followed by a 
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fifth one in September of the same year. Ultimately, Chinese influence seems to have 
been rather minimal, as its tougher stance was not able to deter North Korea from 
continuing on its path of nuclear weapons development. 
 In the latest negotiations, China continues to take more of a backseat than in the 
past. Perhaps this is due to the strained relationship between the two countries and Kim’s 
own desire to distance his regime from the influence of China. This does not mean that 
China is completely out of the picture. While China does not want a nuclear-armed North 
Korea, it is in favor of a DPRK strong enough to resist U.S. pressure, which would be in 
China’s favor. But more importantly, Chinese priorities over mediating on the nuclear 
issue on the Korean peninsula are not as high as that of the U.S. national security 
agenda.62 Furthermore, China still has teeth in the game, especially in light of the visits 
conducted by Kim to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping. In March 2018, Kim made 
his first visit to Beijing since he assumed power in 2011, with a visit by Song Tao, head 
of the International Liaison Department of China’s Central Committee, to Pyongyang 
only a few weeks later in mid-April. This was subsequently followed by a visit by Kim to 
Xi in the city of Dalian in May, prior to Kim’s summit with Trump in June.63 In October 
2018, it was also announced that Xi would make his own visit to Pyongyang, his first 
since assuming power in 2013.64 
 Even as China has taken a muted role when compared to the past, China has not 
relegated the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization solely to the hands of the United 
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States. In fact, it is in China’s interest that the unification or amelioration of the 
relationship between the two Koreas happens, with a peace treaty finally being agreed 
upon. In this case, there would be no need for an American military presence on the 
peninsula. In this scenario, both Koreas, due to political and economic concerns would 
naturally tilt more towards China than the United States. While China has passed the 
buck to the United States on dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program for now, it 
continues to maintain and further develop its ties to the country not only through the 
increased political visits but also through the trade that continues to sustain the regime 
amidst the severe sanctions.65  
Thus, in the midst of the hegemonic battle of the United States and China in the 
East, each country blames the other for not discharging its “responsibilities” during this 
nuclear crisis. Breaking the current deadlock does not seem quite possible, especially as 
the DPRK draws ever nearer to developing its own WMDs. Yet an in-depth analysis 
reveals that the opportunity for leverage on the international stage offered by the North 
Korean crisis still seems to outweigh considerations of international peace and security 
for the United States and China. Furthermore, Pyongyang was forced into a Hobson’s 
choice when it chose to develop WMDs. Therefore, the United States and China’s 
strategic interest in North Korea and the current crisis and their geopolitical strategies of 
interventionism in East Asia explain the reason for the North Korean nuclear deadlock. 
Not only was Pyongyang bound to develop its own nuclear weapons out of security 
concerns, but also the geopolitics and the intertwined interests on the Korean peninsula 
from outside have made it nearly impossible for the nuclear crisis to be solved.  
 
                                                     




IV. International Response to DPRK Denuclearization 
The UN Security Council has passed a number of resolutions in an effort to 
punish DPRK for activities that have undermined global peace and security, and the 
United States has implemented harsh sanctions through both unilateral and 
multilateral measures to isolate the regime.66 Following its first nuclear test in 2006, 
the UNSC levied sanctions under Resolution 1718, which limited the supply of heavy 
weaponry, missile technology and other such materiel, and certain luxury goods. 
Despite such punishments, however, the DPRK under the Kim Jong-il regime 
continued their progress on nuclear weapons technology, resulting in UNSC 
Resolution 1874 after the second nuclear explosion measured in 2009.67 Resolution 
1874 strengthened the previous Resolution 1718, expanding limits on the import and 
export of arms and related material, along with the prohibition of financial transfers 
and services in relation to such activities, where states had to report on inspections 
and seizures of sales, transfers, and supply of such arms prohibited by the 
resolution.68 
Yet, even with such unbearable pressure from the outside, North Korea’s constant 
provocation through missile launches over the past decade have demonstrated how 
desperate the country has been to achieve the status of a nuclear-armed state. North 
Korea’s nuclear program did not end with the death of Kim Jong-il, but rather gained 
momentum under the rule of his son, Kim Jong-un. Within a span of five years, the 
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UNSC adopted Resolutions 2094 and 2087 in 2013, Resolutions 2321 and 2270 in 
2016, and Resolutions 2375, 2371, and 2397 in 2017. These resolutions were all in 
response to the continuing nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK, as well as violations 
of previous sanctions on satellite and missile launches and other such provocations. 
Such sanctions further limited imports on necessary resources not only for nuclear 
weapons development but also on missile technology, along with oil, metal, and 
agricultural and labor imports and exports.69 Nevertheless, as the most recent 
weapons testing in November 2018 demonstrated, such UN sanctions have been 
unsuccessful in deterring the DPRK from engaging in further weapons development.  
Meanwhile, in order to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea, 
other countries have also imposed bilateral sanctions, including the EU, United 
States, South Korea, and Japan. In response to the nuclear testing, the European 
Union imposed further sanctions, preventing those who had facilitated North Korea’s 
weapon testing from admission or residence, denying specialized training for North 
Koreans in the EU, prohibiting the export of luxury goods, banning EU investment, 
and capping remittances back to North Korea. The United States on the other hand 
has not only sanctioned North Korea preventing them with materiel access necessary 
for the development of their nuclear weapons technology but also against third party 
entities that funnel funds into North Korea, including Chinese banks, Russian firms, 
and other companies who have violated U.S. export controls against North Korea. 
During the Kim Jong-il era, Japan imposed sanctions on the DPRK, starting in 2006, 
as a response to renewed nuclear testing, restricting both diplomatic and economic 
exchanges but subsequently lifted some sanctions as a means to compel the Kim 
                                                     




Jong-un regime to re-open the investigations of Japanese abductions that occurred in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Despite this temporary easement of sanctions, Japan imposed 
new sanctions once again in 2016 and 2017 following the increased provocations and 
testing conducted by the DPRK, freezing some North Korean and Chinese assets, 
limiting remittances, and banning the entry of North Koreans.  
For South Korea, the issue of harsh sanctions levied against the DPRK has been 
more complex. In order to ameliorate the tense situation between the DPRK and the 
ROK, the South Korean government has often provided the North with humanitarian 
assistance, along with certain economic concessions, including the joint project at the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex, located in North Korean territory. Provocations in 
recent years, however, limited these concessions as seen with the sinking of the South 
Korean naval ship, the Cheonan, in 2010. The May 24 measures, as they were called, 
prevented North Korean ships from using shipping lanes in South Korea, suspended 
inter-Korean economic exchanges except those at Kaesong, and prohibited most 
cultural exchanges.70 Nevertheless, by 2016, even the Kaesong Industrial Complex 
had been closed indefinitely. While South Korean President Moon Jae-in may seek a 
more conciliatory approach to the DPRK, South Korea also maintains several new 
rounds of international sanctions. South Korea most recently approved $8 million in 
humanitarian aid to North Korea, separating them from political issues, but upholds 
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the sanctions levied against its neighbor to the north, seizing a ship suspected of 
importing oil to North Korea in December 2017.71 
Again, however, all such international sanctions, whether they come in the form 
of UN Security Council resolutions or bilateral sanctions levied against the DPRK, 
has proved ineffective in actually coercing North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
weapons program. North Korea has suffered under these sanctions for a long time 
now, and further sanctions may be ineffective as well. Both nuclear deterrence and 
international sanctions have proved that they are not successful in stopping the North 
Korean nuclear weapons program. Thus, there must be another way to induce North 
Korea to abandon its program apart from these already tried and ineffective methods.   
 
V. Case Study on Denuclearization: South Africa 
While the denuclearization of the DPRK has been deemed ineffective as of yet, 
especially given its most recent test, other examples of denuclearization in the past 
have yielded greater success more or less. States such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine willingly gave up their nuclear arsenals after their independence from the 
Soviet Union. However, the difference between these countries and that of the DPRK 
is that these countries never actually created and developed their own nuclear 
technology as a response to threats to the sovereignty of these countries. Instead, 
much of their respective nuclear arsenals were inherited from the Soviet Union, 
where as independent states, they did not have power to maintain or control these 
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weapons. Furthermore, receiving support from the United States and security 
assurances from Russia provided enough incentive to rid themselves of their nuclear 
weapons arsenal, some of the largest stockpiles as Ukraine and Kazakhstan would 
have been the third and fourth largest nuclear powers had they kept their arsenals.72 
From this perspective these experiences of denuclearization may not have the most 
direct relevance on the denuclearization of North Korea. However, on the other hand, 
the denuclearization of South Africa could have more tangible lessons for the North 
Korean case, as they developed, tested, and ultimately dismantled their nuclear 
weapons program.  
The root of South Africa’s nuclear program lies at the apartheid regime that was 
set up in 1948 by the ruling National Party, where the white minority placed greater 
racial restrictions on the majority black population. As a response to this racially 
divisive program, the international community placed greater sanctions on the 
country, further isolating the nation. In the meantime, the independence movements 
and the growing communist trends in neighboring countries, such as Angola and then 
South Africa controlled Namibia created an environment of insecurity.  
Within these currents, South Africa’s natural resources and existing technology 
allowed for the perfect incubator for the country to develop its own nuclear arsenal as 
a means to secure its safety against potential threats to the regime. In creating a 
nuclear arsenal, South Africa possessed a key ingredient – one of the world’s largest 
reserves of uranium ore, otherwise known as yellowcake, providing the United States 
and the United Kingdom nearly 40,000 tons of the material over the next few decades 
following World War II. South Africa, in its own part, created the Atomic Energy 





Board (AEB), in order to conduct its own nuclear research, which was later aided by 
U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative that agreed to 
share a nuclear research reactor, SAFARI-I. It was with the United States’ assistance 
that South Africa continued its nuclear research, specifically for the peaceful 
applications of nuclear energy. Then by the late 1960s, South Africa began to shift its 
research on “peaceful nuclear explosives” along the lines of the U.S. own Project 
Plowshare, and by 1971, the Atomic Energy Corporation (formerly the AEB) started 
investigative work on nuclear weapons.73  
However, South Africa’s domestic politics and international strategy began to 
influence the development of nuclear weapons in earnest. The apartheid regime that 
disenfranchised the non-white majority was deemed by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1973 as “a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from 
the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial 
segregation and discrimination… are crimes violating the principles of international 
law… and constituting a serious threat to international peace and security.”74 As a 
result of the apartheid regime, South Africa experienced a period of isolation from the 
West and the rest of the international community. With the scope of the Cold War and 
Soviet influence increasing on the African continent, South Africa viewed this 
isolation as a major national security threat. As former South African President F.W. 
de Klerk notes, “because of apartheid South Africa was becoming more and more 
isolated in the eyes of the rest of the world. There wouldn’t be, in the case of Russian 
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aggression or invasion, assistance from the international community.”75 Thus, as a 
key example of the security dilemma, South Africa’s only recourse seemed to be that 
of nuclear weapons, even if de Klerk does contend that such an arsenal was only 
meant to be used as a deterrent than an actual use of force.  
All the while South Africa received scrutiny over its domestic policies, Soviet 
influence in neighboring African territories created a keen sense of a security threat. 
The Soviet Union’s presences and activities in southern Africa presented a threat to 
the very survival of South Africa. While the USSR provided weapons, technology, 
and know-how to various liberation movements, they were gaining either direct or 
indirect control of those countries, as they gained independence. According to former 
President de Klerk, the Soviet Union “financed the deployment of many thousands of 
Cuban troops, especially to Angola, and this was interpreted as a threat first by Prime 
Minister John Vorster, and following upon him P.W. Botha.”76 For the ruling party in 
South Africa, the close ties between these communist governments and the anti-
apartheid African National Congress certainly posed a threat to their rule and control 
over the country as well. Causing further concern was the war of independence in 
South West Africa, now known as Namibia, which was under South African control. 
The fear was that communists could now use these newly independent and 
communist leaning governments as a stepping stone to launch a communist attack 
against the country.77  
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Thus, by 1974, South African Prime Minister John Vorster approved the nuclear 
weapons program, as the country began developing a uranium gun-type bomb such as 
that used in Hiroshima. While the AEC constructed a uranium enrichment Y-plant, it 
never actually had a test detonation, due to international pressure mounting on the 
country.78 South Africa ultimately created six uranium gun fission weapons of the 
sort used in Hiroshima but did not have the missile capabilities to carry and deliver 
such weapons. If they were to be used at all they would have had to be done so by 
bombers. Nevertheless, South Africa continued to explores the options of upgrading 
the devices themselves. Ultimately, however, the possession of nuclear weapons 
brought a certain sense of political clout to the country. In having such nuclear 
weapons technology, South Africa would never actually deploy them against their 
neighbors in Africa. Instead, the demonstration of South Africa’s nuclear capabilities 
was meant to induce its allies to support it in its most dire time of need. According to 
nonproliferation expert David Albright, such the possession of such technology was 
“not based on war-fighting, but rather was intended as a political strategy designed to 
force Western powers, particularly the United States, to assist South Africa against an 
overwhelming military threat to its territory, or what was referred to in strategy 
documents as finding itself with ‘its back against the wall.’”79 Since its allies had 
already distanced itself from the country, especially with the 1977 UN Security 
Council embargo, South Africa perceived itself as the sole defender against 
communism in southern Africa. Thus, the threat of nuclear war would induce these 
former allies to come to South Africa’s aid to prevent an all-out nuclear war. In this 
                                                     





way, the theory of mutually assured destruction works in a way that South Africa 
becomes an extension of the First World. An anti-communist nuclear attack against 
communist Africa becomes an attack from the First World against the Second (the 
Soviet Union).  
The motivations of the Soviet threat above all other considerations provides an 
insight into why the South African government decided to give up its nuclear arsenal. 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, South Africa no longer had this threat at its 
doorstep. Even though states such as Angola had a communist government in place, 
such states now had no conventional military backing in order to pose a direct threat 
to South Africa’s existence. With the election of de Klerk as President, the nuclear 
weapons program was dismantled given the changing environment that had originally 
induced South Africa to engage in a nuclear weapons program in the first place. As de 
Klerk mentions regarding the denuclearization of South Africa:  
With the coming down of the Berlin Wall, and the breakup of the USSR, the 
threat of Soviet communist expansionism fell away. Simultaneously, I took 
initiatives to start a constitutional dialogue and to bring an end to apartheid. A 
peace accord was signed [in Angola], the Cuban troops were withdrawn, [the 
southern African state of] Namibia became independent. All those factors brought 
us to the point where even if you were a supporter of having nuclear weapons, the 
rationale for that fell away and the nature of [the] threats changed 
fundamentally.80 
 
      The threat assessment that had dictated the need for nuclear weapons was no longer 
there. The Soviet Union’s presence and ability to militarily back up the communist 
governments in Angola and the rebels in Namibia were gone. Thus, there was no need for 
nuclear weapons to induce South Africa’s allies to come to its aid in the case of a 
communist attack. Furthermore, with the factors leading up to the end of apartheid, South 
                                                     




Africa was no longer deemed as a pariah state, where it was shunned by the international 
community. Again, this undermined the need for nuclear weapons as previously espoused 
by the government. Once again, South Africa was part of the international community 
and without the Soviet threat had no need for a nuclear deterrent.  
 On the other hand, there is also speculation that the dismantling of the nuclear 
program had other considerations, particularly the shift in the control of the government 
from white National Party to the multiracial African National Congress. Some suggest 
that the dismantling of the nuclear program was motivated by the desire to prevent the 
ANC from having control over such technology. However de Klerk has denied this, 
saying that the idea of preventing the ANC government from having atomic weapons was 
in no way part of his motivation.81 This seems like a moot point as well given the desire 
for most, although not all, of the ANC for the dismantling of the nuclear program, where 
the ANC made this point a rallying cry during the 1994 elections. Nevertheless, there is 
an argument to be made that the government under de Klerk represented a regime change 
from the traditionalist, racist white majority rule of the National Party to the eventual 
election of the black majority African National Congress.82 Significant in this analysis is 
that the end of apartheid provided a venue through which South Africa could rejoin the 
international community, where the voluntary dismantling of its nuclear weapons 
program provided a greater legitimacy to South Africa’s return and acceptance into the 
international community.  
 Within this light, South Africa’s denuclearization and dismantling of its nuclear 
weapons could be an opportunity for application in the North Korean case. What is 
                                                     





important to understand in this case, however, is that currents both within and outside of 
South Africa induced the country to give up its nuclear arsenal. Within, there was a 
movement to dismantle the system of apartheid, a major impediment that cause 
condemnation from the international community. In fact, it was due to the policy of 
apartheid that led to the embargos and isolation that compelled South Africa to pursue 
nuclear weapons as a method of political strategy in the first place. Furthermore, the 
situation beyond its borders also worked together where the need of nuclear weapons 
became unnecessary. Without the Soviet Union’s military and economic backing of 
neighboring communist governments and the presence of Cuban forces, South Africa no 
longer faced the imminent threat of invasion by such forces. That these two internal and 
external forces would work together to help the DPRK move away from its nuclear 
weapons program seems yet to be seen. With respect to the DPRK, its threat assessment 
is not as simple as was the case for South Africa. The United States and South Korea 
remain a constant and ongoing external threat to the country, while regime change is not 
expected to happen.  
 One important lesson from the South African case is also the use of economic 
sanctions to induce the government to change. Thus far, with regard to the DPRK, 
economic and political sanctions have yet to bear fruit. This was much the same for South 
Africa. With the imposition of sanctions and the embargo, South Africa did not move 
away from its nuclear weapons development even if it did eventually have a role to play. 
Rather such punishments levied against the country had the opposite effect. In the late 
1970s, with the embargo in place, South Africa actually accelerated its programs. With 




provided by China and through the humanitarian assistance provided by South Korea. 
Any concessions made due to sanctions is not likely to provide the international 
community with a quick and immediate result in denuclearization. Furthermore, the 
reason that international pressure had worked on South Africa was because the 
government wanted to be part of the international community rather than exist in its 
isolation. This is quite different from the desires of Kim Jong-un, who prides the nation 
on rebuffing its most powerful adversary, the United States, and still existing despite 
years of “coercive” diplomacy aimed at either regime collapse or denuclearization. Just 
as South Africa used the existence of nuclear weapons as a political ploy to gain Western 
support, North Korea uses its nuclear arsenal to gain concessions from the international 
















Chapter 3: The Motivations of North Korea’s Nuclear Development 
In analyzing the motivations of North Korea’s nuclear development, the theories 
of traditional deterrence must be re-examined. As North Korea becomes that much closer 
to becoming a full-functioning nuclear weapons state, the theories of deterrence as 
espoused by Schelling goes out the window. As seen through the provocations and war of 
words between U.S. President Trump and Kim Jong-un in the earlier half of 2018 show, 
misperception and the fog of war clearly affect the trajectory in the escalation of conflict. 
Rather than following the narrative of Schelling in terms of the security dilemma alone, 
North Korea’s nuclear and conventional weapons development is indeed affected by a 
number of different stresses which may provide a better light of understanding the 
failures of North Korean denuclearization.  
 
I. Regime Survival    
 For the DPRK, regime survival is the first and the most significant objective of all, 
as it is greatly threatened by the widespread—or nearly universal—Western ideals of 
democracy as a communist state. Thus, the United States, as a leading proponent of 
democracy, has been trying to bring down the communist regime, although recently the 
Trump administration has announced publically that it is not seeking a regime change, 
which can be seen as an effort pacify Kim Jong-un. Yet, although it had made such an 
announcement, what the United States truly desires out of North Korea remains the same. 
Therefore, the regime survival has been and will be always at stake without the “ultimate 
deterrence” of possessing its own nuclear weapon, and Kim Jong-un seems to be aware 




 Although North Korea itself has decided to travel down the path of nuclear 
proliferation, we cannot blame the DPRK alone for what has happened during the past 
decade. Many nations in Northeast Asia have experienced insecurity amid a changing 
geopolitical structure, particularly as a result of tensions between the United States and 
China, two powers that are locked in a struggle to oppose each other while containing 
other nations through interventionist efforts—thereby gaining power while making other 
states dependent on them. All this has driven North Korea, in particular, into a corner. 
More even than other nations in the region, the DPRK has suffered the most during this 
superpower showdown—which has largely overlooked this nation, spurning it for its 
nearly nonexistent diplomatic influence, waning economy, and other domestic struggles. 
North Korea avows that its reason for developing WMDs is to ensure the regime’s 
survival and autonomy, having indeed once stated that “the more our enemies try to take 
away our sovereignty and autonomy, our nuclear strike capability and national defense 
grows only stronger.” At a surface level, building such a capability is about survival, as 
mentioned above. Yet, the DPRK also desires diplomatic recognition by the international 
community, and it hopes to achieve that recognition by obtaining nuclear capabilities and 
using its nuclear leverage to maintain its regime. Certainly, Kim Jong-un might well 
prefer active involvement in international discussion to being an isolationist—but no 
authoritarian regime can gain diplomatic recognition in the twenty-first century, least of 
all when most nations are seeking to scrub the world of its Cold War trappings. 
The Obama administration’s own pivot to Asia presented a direct threat to the 
DPRK. In an effort to maintain global hegemony, U.S. presence on East Asian soil is 




continent. The U.S. military forces stationed in South Korea (USFK) seek to protect U.S. 
allies and indeed the entire region from North Korean provocations, thus preserving the 
stability of Northeast Asia. As the United States has rebalanced toward the Asia–Pacific 
region, particularly through the Obama administration’s so-called Pivot to Asia policy, it 
has been emphasizing its ability to offer a “nuclear umbrella,” which is to say an 
extended deterrence, such as has been in place since the mid-1900s.83 By doing so, the 
United States not only protects its allies from regional provocations, especially at the 
hands of the DPRK, but also maintains its leverage over China—which threatens the 
American global hegemony—by making U.S. allies, especially the ROK and Japan, more 
dependent on the United States than on the PRC. Such a geopolitical strategy is merely a 
continuation of the interventionist policies that have marked the United States’ nearly 
250-year history but nevertheless present a real and present danger to the DPRK.  
North Korea realizes all this. Unwilling to change its mode of government, it 
instead has taken more forceful measures to increase or at least maintain its own national 
power. Ultimately, after having gained sufficient power, and thereby the 
acknowledgement of other sovereign states in the international realm, it even aims to 
reunite the two Koreas on its own terms, ending North and South Korea’s interrupted 
state of war. In short, the objectives of developing its own nuclear weapon for North 
Korea are about both the survival and protection of its regime and interests. Such an 
analysis of North Korea’s desires for nuclear weapons comes as no surprise, especially 
given the previous discussion over the South African experience. For South Africa, 
nuclear weapons aspirations were in part due to the need for regime survival. With the 
                                                     





increase in Cuban forces on the African continent and the leftist governments that had 
assumed power in recently independent Angola and Mozambique, South Africa sensed an 
imminent threat to its political survival from these communist threats. Thus, the use of 
nuclear weapons was used as an extreme deterrent to these potentially inimical forces, but 
also to induce its allies to provide support in case of attack. Either way you slice it, South 
Africa’s justification for its nuclear weapons development arose from the insecurity that 
it felt in the region and the isolation created by the international sanctions arising from its 
apartheid regime. Such motivations are not too far off from North Korea’s. North Korea 
views nuclear weapons as a means to protect itself from its enemy, namely the United 
States, who in the past has sought regime collapse and/or change. Placing North Korea on 
its terrorist list in the past has not been favorable to this end, stoking the flames of 
animosity against the United States. With the ever present U.S. presence on the Korean 
Peninsula and the region through its bases in both Korea and Japan, North Korea must 
contend with this ever present threat which only escalates with the joint military training 
in which the ROK and the United States engage.  
Moreover, Kim Jong-un, having had ample opportunity to learn from history, has 
observed how nuclear armament has provided indisputable presence and power in the 
international domain—as it did for the United States and the USSR—as well as how 
nuclear disarmament has brought irrefutable disadvantages. In the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, possessing some of the world’s largest nuclear 
arsenals gave up such weapons willingly. While Russia still maintained operational 
control of the ICBMs in Ukrainian territory, Ukraine itself had a greater capacity to 




mounting international pressure from both Russia, who viewed the nuclear weapons as 
their own, and the United States, focused on non-proliferation and denuclearization 
eventually compelled Ukraine to give up and dismantle the nuclear weapons on its 
territory.84 However, this begs the question over whether the events of the Russian 
annexation of Crimea and its military entanglements in the eastern regions would have 
occurred had Ukraine maintained its nuclear arsenal. From these developments, Kim 
Jong-un could see that the denuclearization of a country’s nuclear arsenal as a result of 
international pressures could be detrimental down the road. Just as the Ukraine face 
territorial encroachment from Russia, the DPRK could face a similar fate, whether that 
invasion comes from South Korea and the United States or even from its perceived ally, 
China.  
Recently the DPRK has seen Libya and Iraq give up their nuclear programs, with 
brutal consequences following for both. Kim Jong-un’s emphasis on developing nuclear 
missile technology, then, might well have arisen from careful consideration of the 
declines of his fellow dictators, Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein, after their 
nations’ disarmament.85 In an effort to reduce international sanctions levied against 
Libya, Muammar Gaddafi began a series of negotiations that would ultimately lead to the 
dismantling of the country’s nuclear weapons development in 2003. With the ultimatum 
from the United States that Libya would need to do something about its potential cache of 
weapons of mass destruction, Libyan officials approach its American counterparts to gain 
concessions regarding its sanctions. In this regard, “Libya was willing to deal because of 
                                                     
84 Budjeryn.  
85 “How the Miserable Death of Moammar Gadhafi Factors into Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear 





credible diplomatic representations by the United States over the years, which convinced 
the Libyans that doing so was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic goals.”86 
The decision to give up Libya’s nuclear program ultimately came from Qaddafi who 
through measures promised by the United States would result in certain benefits for 
Libya and his regime, namely easing international sanctions. While Libya may not have 
had nuclear weapons or a program as advanced as the DPRK does today, this was a 
significant turn of policy for Qaddafi’s Libya.87 Fast forwarding to the deposing and 
execution of Qaddafi, the issue over disarmament and the abandonment of the nuclear 
program brings into question, especially for the DPRK as it looks to past precedents, 
about whether or not disarmament and denuclearization is the best strategy for North 
Korea. In the face of the Arab Spring and Qaddafi’s heavy handed approach at quelling 
rebellion, the United States and Europe sent forces in to stop him. Had there been a 
nuclear arsenal at Qaddafi’s disposal, perhaps some could speculate that the United States 
and its allies would not have so readily intervened and allowed for the conditions to 
depose Qaddafi so easily. This was echoed by the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry in 2011, 
following the Libyan outcome, where it called Libya’s disarmament agreement “an 
invasion tactic to disarm the country… The Libyan crisis is teaching the international 
community a grave lesson.”88 For North Korea, this lesson is that the West cannot be 
trusted, as the relinquishing of such weapons and measures for security would ultimately 
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render the DPRK vulnerable to possible international intervention that could undermine 
the Kim regime.  
This vulnerability from the dismantling of its weapons arsenal, including the 
nuclear ones, was evident in the case of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, prior to the disarmament 
decision from Qaddafi in 2003. Given the speculation of weapons of mass destruction in 
Iraq, the United Nations pushed for resolutions that would bring about the disarmament 
in Iraq of such weapons. In November 2002, the UN adopted Resolution 1441, which 
required the Iraqi government to begin steps toward the dismantling and disarmament of 
such weapons, stipulated in previous resolutions dating back to 1991, following the 
Persian Gulf War.89 Despite Iraq’s seeming cooperation with UN inspectors over the 
suspected its supposed weapons of mass destruction, the unfounded belief that Iraq was 
lying about its weapons cache led to the pressure from the United States and its allies on 
the international stage, including before the UN, which ultimately led to a unilateral 
declaration of war by the United States, later followed suit by its allies, against Saddam 
Hussein and Iraq. Such calls on Iraq included U.S. Secretary of State Colin Power, 
declaring before the UN Security Council, “How much longer are we willing to put up 
with Iraq’s noncompliance before we, as a council, we, as the United Nations, say: 
‘Enough.’”90 This only exacerbates the issue of credibility of the United States and its 
allies with respect to the DPRK. Even in the case of disarmament, if the United States has 
shown in the recent past that it would drum up support based on false evidence in order to 
invade and attack a sovereign state. This poses a very serious security threat to the very 
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existence of the DPRK, whether or not the United States may actually launch an invasion 
of North Korea (although given the interests and geopolitical players involved in this 
issue, this outcome is not as likely as that of Iraq). Nevertheless, the potential for invasion 
remains.  
The credibility of the United States comes into further question when looking at 
the Iran nuclear deal. Long suspected of developing a nuclear weapon, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and Germany came to an agreement in 2015 
on Iran’s nuclear program. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran had 
agreed to limit certain nuclear activities while allowing international inspectors into the 
country in exchange for the lifting of sanctions that had crippled the country’s 
economy.91 Despite President Obama signing the agreement, with the election of 
President Trump, this agreement was ripped up, at least on the American side. A deputy 
secretary of state under the Obama administration, Antony J. Blinken referred to this and 
the Libyan case with concern vis-à-vis the DPRK: “I would be very concerned that the 
combination of Libya and then Trump tearing up the Iran agreement sends exactly the 
wrong message to Kim Jong-un and undermines whatever hope exists for negotiations.”92 
The reneging of its international agreement on Iran only goes to show Kim Jong-un that 
the agreements made by the United States have no actual meaning, as successive 
presidents could just as easily go back on their word.  
That disarmament has been achieved in some cases does not give us reason to 
assume that other dictators would follow the same path. Rather, Kim Jong-un seems to 
have taken the disarmaments of Libya and Iraq as a life lesson: nuclear weapons can 
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assure their owners of survival. Seen from Kim’s point of view, Muammar Gaddafi and 
Saddam Hussein faced the ends of their regimes after being rendered powerless, as it 
were, by the loss of their respective weapons programs. What’s more, Kim might now 
have come to believe that “hostile” foreign forces, particularly the United States, will 
always seek to overthrow authoritarian regimes. Such a view would align well with North 
Korea’s strong reaction to National Security Advisor John Bolton’s recommendation of 
the “Libya model” for coping with North Korea. Kim Jong-un does not want to be 
another Muammar Gaddafi, losing first his nuclear weapons and then his regime. 
 
II. North Korea, a “Victim” of Superpower Showdown  
 The DPRK’s path towards nuclear development and the lack of progress towards 
denuclearization may not be solely within the realm of security dilemma, but due to the 
historical and political consequences of superpowers. Although North Korea itself has 
decided to travel down the path of nuclear proliferation, we cannot blame the DPRK 
alone for what has happened during the past decade. Many nations in Northeast Asia 
have experienced insecurity amid a changing geopolitical structure, particularly as a 
result of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States 
and China. Two powers are locked in a struggle to oppose each other while containing 
other nations through interventionist efforts—thereby gaining power while making other 
states dependent on them. All this has driven North Korea, in particular, into a corner. 
More even than other nations in the region, the DPRK has suffered the most during this 
superpower showdown—which has largely overlooked this nation, spurning it for its 




Countries that feel subordinated to the United States and China, caught up in these 
superpowers’ increasingly forceful blandishments, might see these two nations as a 
greater threat to their sovereignty than North Korea could ever realistically pose. The fact 
that these sparring superpowers—which often play leading roles in the Security Council 
as it attempts to solve the problems posed by the DPRK—themselves have nuclear 
warheads only underscores the contradictions in the current relationship between the G-2 
and North Korea. Although prone to impromptu actions, Kim Jong-un may perhaps be 
perceived by many nations in the region as an educated human being loath to make so 
self-destructive a decision as detonating a nuclear missile in sole hostility. Indeed, to 
these countries, the United States and China might well pose a decidedly clearer and 
more urgent threat. 
 Both the United States and the PRC seek to project greater geopolitical power in 
the international realm, defying each other’s influence, conflicts tend toward escalation. 
Amid this geopolitical mire, one of the most intractable challenges the world faces as a 
result of this hegemonic rivalry in the Asia–Pacific region is the North Korean nuclear 
crisis. With regard to the United States, the defensive posturing created by the pivot to 
Asia has led to the belief that a nuclear DPRK provides a clear and dangerous threat that 
the United States could use to its advantage in maintaining a presence on the Korean 
peninsula and the greater Asian continent. This might be why some observers see the 
North Korean crisis as more opportunity for the United States than threat to it, from a 
macro perspective. If we disregard the less realistic scenario of the United States taking a 
complete hegemonic control in the East, indeed, the ideal situation for the United States 




a pretext for the United States, in the form of the USFK, to be physically present in East 
Asia—ready to hold China in check. Overthrowing the North Korean regime is not only 
infeasible but also unnecessary for the United States. If the United States were to 
overthrow the regime entirely and make North Korea a democratic nation—were this 
even possible—then U.S. influence in the region would wane. The best situation for the 
United States is the status quo, which allows it to take advantage of the North Korean 
crisis. 
The most important factor in China’s policy decisions regarding East Asia is that 
of “stability.” Chinese history has been a 5,000-year series of uprisings and invasions that 
have given rise to an almost morbid fear of instability and disorder. Thus, China is deeply 
averse to the instability of North Korea and the Kim regime, which threatens to create 
instability within China as thousands of defectors cross the Chinese–North Korean 
border. Such an eventuality could cripple China’s economic growth, hindering the nation 
in its attempts to compete in the hegemonic contest against the United States. The most 
ideal situation for China, from the standpoint of promoting stability on the Korean 
peninsula while preserving Chinese geopolitical interests, is one that maintains the Kim 
regime as a buffer state bereft of nuclear capability. Yet achieving a denuclearized North 
Korea will be extremely difficult—so the next best situation for the PRC is, as it is for the 
United States, the status quo. But actually acknowledging that the reason for the 
international community’s inability to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis largely 
derives from the geopolitical strategies of the United States and China on the Korean 





 Such hegemonic geopolitical strategies of both the United States and China place 
undue burden on the DPRK. The competition between these two superpowers could also 
contribute to the fact that the DPRK continues to enhance its own nuclear capabilities. 
While there may be some belief that China and the DPRK share a close relationship, this 
may not be totally true given closer scrutiny. For much of Kim Jong-un’s rule, China had 
previously taken a more hands-off approach, leaving the United States to apply a heavy 
pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. It was not until the Trump summit with Kim 
Jong-un and the potential for a peace process that would exclude China completely that 
China shifted its approach. In more recent months, more bilateral meetings at various 
levels of the government have happened, with President Xi expected to make his first 
visit to Pyongyang since he assumed power. Such a shift from economic coercion to get 
Pyongyang to capitulate to the more traditional geostrategic approach of considering the 
DPRK along the lines of the “traditional friendship” and fellow socialist state provides a 
boon for the DPRK as well.93 The strengthened relationship allows for more freedom for 
the DPRK to pursue its nuclear aspirations.  
Yet, in reality, what is happening here is that the DPRK through its nuclear weapons 
development is able to extract the greatest concessions taking advantage of the 
hegemonic competition. Prior to 2018, Kim Jong-un had also kept his distance from 
China, perhaps as a means to reduce Chinese influence on his regime, as he was trying to 
consolidate his power. Meanwhile given the downturn in relations with China, by 
creating enough animosity to build confrontation with the United States through its 
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nuclear and missile testing, the DPRK chose to leave China out of its bilateral talks with 
the United States. By pitting the United States and China against each other, given both 
their leadership aspirations on both the regional and global stage, the DPRK is indeed 
able to get greater concessions without actually giving up anything on its end. Using the 
United States, the Kim was essentially able to negotiate the terms of his relationship with 
China, visiting with President Xi twice, and bringing China from a stance of economic 
blockade to reigniting the warmer relationship in the past that brought trade and other 
goods to the isolated country. Moreover, by increasing its threatening posture, Pyongyang 
has enabled the United States to change its tactics. While economic sanctions may not be 
lifted, “the political will to implement tough sanctions has been weakened. The thrust 
behind the ‘maximum pressure’ approach has been dulled considerably.”94 
 
III. The Power of Nuclear Weapons 
In addition to the factor of the hegemonic battle for East Asia and Kim Jong-un’s 
decision to profit by the examples of his fellow dictators, several other factors also have 
helped solidify Kim Jong-un’s determination to hold on to the “inevitable choice”—or, 
from his standpoint, the most “effective” choice—of developing North Korean WMDs. 
North Korea had gone through hardship, particularly during 1990s, and experienced a 
near-collapse of the regime.95 As the nation was plunged into an Arduous March during 
the ruling under Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un, through his father’s experience, was able to 
observe what it might be like when the regime collapses. Moreover, Kim had 
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opportunities to learn from historical instances where nuclear armament provided 
indisputable presence and power in the international domain.  
 If we look at the history of North Korea, the nation has suffered several crises 
since its foundation. The Arduous March in the 1990s marked its worst period, resulting 
in the loss of millions of lives. This was a combination of an economic collapse and a 
severe famine. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, one of North Korea’s closest 
allies at the time, the North Korean economy plummeted, leading to a famine that lasted 
for years. A series of floods only worsened the situation. Impoverished North Korean 
civilians starved to death, eventually leading to a massive estimated death toll of three 
million. Kim Jong-il, the supreme leader at the time, faced the near collapse of his 
regime.96 Such adversity in the 20th century led Kim to strongly hold on to the belief that 
North Korea needed to develop some type of solid measures to ensure the survival of the 
regime and maintain a strong nation under the ruling family. Thus, the ultimate answer 
was a nuclear weapon, although the nuclear program in North Korea had already “begun 
in late 1950s with cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union on a nuclear research 
program near Yongbyon.”97 Kim realized that the nation would not be able to win an 
economic battle against its neighbors. Also, to avoid being perceived as weak, the 
country used the tactic of “fear” to maintain leverage over other countries. Kim Jong-un, 
Kim Jong-il’s successor, now believes that the development of a WMD is the only way to 
keep his nation relevant on the world stage and to defend the nation’s peace and dignity.98 
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Having learned from North Korean history and experiences, and understanding Kim 
Jong-un’s principal objectives for nuclear weapon development programs—mainly, 
survival of the regime—the international effort to fight against the DPRK bears 
discussion.  
 In addition to experiencing national instability caused by the famine and 
deteriorating economy, North Korea also was able to look at examples of nuclear 
weapons not only assuring nations of their security through the measure of nuclear 
deterrence, but also providing those nations with enormous economic and diplomatic 
power in the international system. Antithetical to these countries with nuclear capability, 
there have been examples of nations that were once armed with nuclear weapons losing 
power with the disarmament. Kim Jong-un might have also speculated that there is a 
strong correlation between having nuclear capability and political power (table. 1), 
regardless of such a statement has proven to be true or not. The examples of nuclear arms 
race during the Cold War, particularly by the U.S, Soviet Union, and China, had 
delivered a subtle message that once a nation establishes and proves its nuclear capability, 
diplomatic acknowledgement from other nations also come with such a development. 
With the United States’ atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Japan was 
quick to surrender. After observing the “favorable” impacts of developing WMDs on the 
national power, eager to win the competition for supremacy in nuclear warfare, Soviet 
Union tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949, which ended a period of American atomic 
monopoly. Before its development of nuclear arsenals, Soviet Union was often reluctant 
to support North Korea’s invasion of the South due to the unpreparedness of their forces. 
Yet with the successful nuclear detonation, the USSR was assured with confidence and 





finally notified Kim Il-sung about his willingness to help in the fight. 
 Amidst the ongoing battle of ideologies of Cold War, China was able to 
successfully test its first nuclear weapon in 1964. China realized that the military and 
political power gaps between the nuclear armed and non-armed state were getting bigger 
particularly during the era. Such a movement came as a shock to many. There exist 
numerous factors in the United States’ withdrawal of its forces from the Vietnam War, 
such as high number of U.S casualties and substantial amount of money spent for such a 
little progress made. Yet China’s success in its nuclear detonation also contributed to the 
United States’ nuclear deterrence in the war, whether it was for its morality of not 
abusing the nuclear power or was out of a fear of defeat as the aggression by the Soviet 
Union and China had escalated.  
 All of these examples of nuclear weapons providing authority in the global realm 
during the Cold War prompted the insecure Kim family to incessantly pursue the path of 
developing its nuclear arsenal. Interestingly, the entire picture of China going through the 
process of becoming a nuclear-armed state greatly resembles the current nuclear saga 
with North Korea. In addition to the history of nuclear armament empowering such 
nations mentioned above, the DPRK has also observed a few countries, such as Iraq and 
Libya recently going through the disarmament process as provided earlier in the chapter. 
The consequences for giving up the nuclear arsenals were brutal for both countries.  
Moreover, in terms of dealing with the North Korean nuclear issues, Pyongyang 
may find the dismantlement-first mentality of certain countries in the international 
community quite unfair. Currently, a number of other nations in the world boast nuclear 




include Russia, the United States, France, China, and the United Kingdom. Interestingly, 
the United States and China, two of the most crucial nations in dealing with the current 
crisis, hold the world’s greatest quantity of nuclear weapons, being ranked second and 
fourth, respectively. Furthermore, ironically all five permanent members of the U.N 
Security Council— United States, China, France, Russia, and U.K.—who take the 
leadership role in preventing North Korean nuclear provocations all possess nuclear 
warheads and also included in the top ten largest economies in terms of their GDP (Table 
3). Hence, it may seem largely discriminatory to rule out DPRK from the list. 





Why, then, has the international community been attempting to prevent North 
Korea from possessing nuclear capabilities? What the international community fears most 
is not the addition of another nuclear state to the world’s roster but rather the DPRK’s 
being that state. This is largely due to both North Korea’s unique political structure, 
which sees a single-family control every aspect of the nation under the auspices of a 
hereditary authoritarian regime, and the temperament of its current leader, Kim Jong-un, 
who is often perceived as being “irrational” and impulsive. Kim, in his role as supreme 
commander, might well abuse his power to do whatever he desires and that on a whim—
including through the detonation of nuclear weapons, whether across the region, the 
continent, or anywhere in the world should he gain the ability to do so. Thus, many see 
North Korea being a nuclear-armed state as a threat more than any other non-armed 
nations crossing that nuclear threshold. 
 Nevertheless, from North Korea’s point of view, nuclear power might well 
produce political power, which might then produce economic power. As Table 1 
indicates, six of the ten countries having the world’s highest-ranking GDPs also boast a 
nuclear capability. Although such a correlation certainly is not proof of causation in 
either direction, possession of a nuclear arsenal might well tantalize Pyongyang with 
offers of global status, power, and prosperity. As the trend has shown, the development of 
nuclear weapons has certainly brought greater attention to North Korea, and talks of 
denuclearization has enabled certain concessions to be made that has long favored the 
North Korean regime. Despite the economic and trade sanctions placed upon the DPRK 
since its initial testing during the Kim Jong-il regime and after it left the NPT, the Six 




Korea in terms of economic benefits, whether through international assistance or through 
the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex. While such concessions may not be made today, 
the power and prestige given to Kim has allowed for him to consolidate power and 
authority within the DPRK, as well as within the international sphere, where his threats 
may be deemed credible and therefore worthy of attention, even resulting in the bilateral 
meeting that the DPRK desire at the Singapore summit in summer 2018.  
 A strong correlation between nuclear capacity and political power may no longer 
be accurate in the twenty-first century due to the widespread non-proliferation 
movements across the globe; thus, the perfecting of its nuclear program may not make 
North Korea invincible. Yet if developing WMDs were a nation’s last possible resort to 
both the survival and consolidating its power internationally, no one would be too 
hesitant to make such a decision to rely on the opportunity—especially if a country is not 
intimidated to make any deviant choices from the norm and unafraid of being considered 
“irrational and inappropriate” by many nations.   
 Even though it may take a few more years until the DPRK perfectly develops its 
nuclear missiles, we could nearly suppose that North Korea is closer to such capability, 
looking at the seismic yields of its previous tests, especially the sixth nuclear test. Yet, 
what is more important than its capability is its willingness to use such a catastrophic 
weapon on humanity. North Korea’s relentless, vicious cycle of hostility, notwithstanding 
the United Nations’ adoption of one of the toughest sanctions in the world, has revealed 
Kim Jong-un’s willingness to provoke other nations with his ballistic missile tests. Yet 
this is not quite equivalent to his willingness to actually detonate hydrogen bombs over 




use its nuclear weapon that could destroy humankind, including his people. 
 Yet, we must realize that although Kim Jong-un often seems to make deranged 
decisions, he was and will never be suicidal. His ultimate objective in investing so much 
energy and resources into its nuclear weapons program is to maintain the Kim regime. If 
Kim Jong-un were to carry out a preemptive strike, it would, then, mean World War III, 
which would lead to a destruction of all, particularly more so for North Korea. Thus, as 
he cannot risk a war if he wants to maintain the regime, he would, then, avoid using its 
nuclear weapon, as he knows it would be a suicidal action if he were to use it. Therefore, 
we can speculate that North Korea will not start a nuclear war by using its WMDs, unless 
other countries strike the DPRK first. Hence, North Korean nuclear crisis is not a “real” 
threat in a sense that the possibility of an outbreak of World War III by the North is 
extremely low.  
 North Korea will not easily initiate a nuclear strike on its neighboring countries or 
the United States, as the consequences of doing so would be self-destruction. Yet, though 
the national and regime’s interest exists and, henceforth, we may be convinced that we 
are still not on the brink of nuclear war, we cannot entirely exclude the possibility of the 
World War III. Once North Korea feels the regime survival would not be guaranteed 
anymore, recognizing the near collapse, the country may, then, turn suicidal.  
 
IV. Changing environment of nuclear weapons  
 Furthermore, no longer is the capability for nuclear weapons enough to function 
as a deterrent in today’s world. In a post-Cold War era with unipolar—or multipolar—




of nuclear weapons no longer appears to automatically generate deterrence value. Hence, 
to prevent conflicts at all levels of armed intensity, “tailored deterrence” must be enacted 
according to the opposing nation’s capacity and environment. This strategy is particularly 
applicable to nations with less power because it allows greater flexibility while also 
providing more effective tools to maximize the state’s deterrent power. It permits a 
“David-nation” to fight countries with greater military capacity, using “smaller” yet 
powerful arsenals and ultimately bringing about victories. When preparing for 
asymmetric warfare, instead of focusing overly on the construction of large-yield 
strategic weapons to strike the giant’s command and control center directly, the 
development of better version of “slings”—in other words, tactical nuclear weapons—in 
a greater number can be more efficient in terms of ensuring success. Meanwhile, if a 
nation can have both, it would have the greatest synergy and flexibility.   
 Pyongyang has adopted the strategy of going both high and low in its tactics 
against the United States by investing greater resources into both tactical nuclear 
weapons and non-nuclear arms, as well as almost achieving the status of a nuclear-armed 
state with ICBMs that could reach the U.S. mainland. Because nuclear weapons alone 
cannot be a “diplomatic magic wand,” the DPRK has also been striving to challenge 
other states in various domains such as cyberspace.99 North Korea’s proactive measures 
to develop a range of “slings” —low-yield but effective “arsenals”—is of great concern 
to countries such as the United States. Just as the United States’ new Nuclear Posture 
Review pointed out, the further development of low-yield submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles is necessary for the United States to reduce the 
possibility of using high-yield weapons at all levels of conflict. The States should 
                                                     




continue with its tailored deterrence strategy against North Korea so as not to be hit on its 
forehead. Although revamping its low-yield arsenals could possibly send unnecessary or 
unintended signals to other nations, doing so would be greatly helpful to combat at all 
levels of battle in practically any political environment. In this way, it would not remain 
as a Goliath with an exposed forehead, but as a giant with solid power and authority in 






















The era of nuclear deterrence is indeed different from that of the Cold War. When 
dealing with the denuclearization of the DPRK, it is important to note the various factors 
that prevent and continue to fuel the fire for the regime’s desire for nuclear weapons. 
Nevertheless, the unpredictable provocations of the DPRK still remain a destabilizing 
factor not just in Northeast Asia, but around the world, given the possibility of 
technology leak or nuclear weapons trade. But going forward, analysts and policy makers 
alike will have to re-wire their thinking on approaching denuclearization.  
First, the collapse of North Korea will not occur, nor will regime change. Some 
believe that the collapse of North Korea is near and inevitable due to the sanctions 
imposed by the United Nations and the DPRK’s closed regime structure. Moreover, this 
opinion was once popular given the country’s unstable economy, but also several news 
reports of Kim Jong-un’s growing unpopularity; thus, the country is politically as well as 
socially insecure, lending credence to the idea that the collapse could be expected to 
happen soon. However, though unstable and often encountering crises, this political 
system has lasted nearly seventy years. Therefore, one of the points to establish in 
discussing the battle against North Korean nuclear proliferation is that “the collapse of 
the DPRK is near, so let us wait until it does collapse”—the strategy so-called “strategic 
patience”—is not a good solution to address this international threat. Though collapse is 
one possibility, it is not likely to happen in the near future. As long as its allies, most 
importantly China, stand behind the country and the black market continues to exist, the 
regime’s survival is largely assured.  




collapse may not be a likely impending outcome, the idea of regime survival is still 
integral to understanding the North Korean aspirations for nuclear weapons. Regime 
survival may be secure more or less, but the perception of threats to regime survival 
remain a key motivation for such weapons. For Kim Jong-un, the arsenal of nuclear 
weapons provides an effective tool to create an environment that is conducive for 
agreements made that would benefit his regime and authority over North Korea. 
Furthermore, just as in the South African case, the threats to regime survival often spur 
on a security dilemma where the development of such weapons provides the country with 
an added sense of security that it otherwise would not have. This is even more poignant 
given the fact that North Korea and its issues over denuclearization serves as a proxy 
front for the hegemonic competition between China and the United States, both nuclear 
weapons powers with more nuclear stockpiles than that possessed by the DPRK.  
 Second, analysts cannot assume that Kim Jong-un will give up the DPRK’s 
nuclear weapons without any concessions from the international community—more 
specifically South Korea, China, or the United States. The country and its people 
sacrificed a great deal to come thus far in their agenda. For a country that regards a 
“nuclear arsenal” as the only way to maintain its national interests and defend itself, an 
assumption that the country will suddenly cease its development programs is too 
optimistic. The ending of its nuclear weapon program out of its own will is not an option 
in this study. While the desire for denuclearization must happen within like it did for 
South Africa and Libya, such an outcome will most likely not happen. Given the past 
track record, North Korea has often used its nuclear weapons program to derive 




probably not end any time soon. Thus, for a focus on denuclearization based on North 
Korea just giving up and disarming its nuclear weapons is folly. Deterrence, furthermore, 
is not enough to coerce North Korea to give up its weapons technology.  
 Moreover, a military strike against North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons 
would not resolve the issue. The United Nations and the international community are 
seeking a peaceful way of countering North Korean aggression. Moreover, such an 
aggressive path taken by the United States or other influential countries might lead to 
World War III, which could involve nuclear weapons. Such a war would likely mean 
self-destruction. We have observed the same pattern from the Cold War between the 
United States and Soviet Union. They never fought a war against each other, as they both 
knew the consequences of such a war. Even as Trump and Kim escalated their war of 
words in the early half of 2018, tension rose to brinksmanship but never truly amounted 
to an all-out war. This is precisely the problem when dealing with the DPRK. 
Provocations in the past have led to tensions on the Korean Peninsula, especially those 
attacks made against South Korea. However, in more recent years, the negative 
consequences have been very limited and regardless of increased provocations, seen in 
the form of rocket and missile launches and nuclear testing, has never really truly led to 
the possibility of war, along the lines of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Within this idea, we 
come to the last and most important assumption and consideration when dealing with the 
North Korean nuclear crisis.  
 Most of the national leaders will make “rational” decisions—especially Kim 
Jong-un whose national and, thus, own survival is at stake. A war would only occur if 




action,” such as bringing about negotiations or opening up the conversation channel, does 
not necessarily need an outbreak of a nuclear war. This is something that Kim Jong-un is 
very well-versed in. Throughout his rule, he has used his nuclear weapons development, 
testing, and the competition for hegemonic control in Northeast Asia to his advantage. By 
pushing forward on the progress of his nuclear weapons program and instigating and 
fueling the conflict with Donald Trump, he was able to bring about a bilateral meeting 
with the United States that had not happened during the Obama administration. 
Furthermore, in isolating China from the equation and bringing up talks of a peace 
agreement without Chinese influence or intervention, Kim switched the Chinese stance 
towards the DPRK. In doing so, the Kim regime and the DPRK developed stronger ties 
that would enable it to continue its nuclear weapons aspirations. When taking all these 
developments into consideration, it does show the incredible statesmanship and logic 
used by Kim to play China and the United States against each other without truly losing 
too much on his own side. For Trump, Kim, and even Xi, there is a sense of rationality. 
Kim wants the survival of his regime but not at the expense of an all-out war. While the 
DPRK’s already isolated status provides Kim with greater freedoms to act more 
“irrationally,” Kim seems to understand that other members of the international 
community, specifically China and the United States who both have deep stakes in the 
status quo, are more restricted in their moves and thus Kim is able to manipulate this 
situation.  
 Ultimately, denuclearization on the Korean peninsula remains a key issue for the 
international community, especially as the provocations and testing of missiles and 




on the country. In the approach for denuclearization, however, the traditional approach of 
deterrence may not be as applicable as it was in the past during the Cold War. At stake 
for the DPRK is perceived regime survival, especially with threatening rhetoric and 
posture from the United States, escalating under the presidency of Donald Trump. Yet, at 
the same time, there is no true political will in dismantling the nuclear program, whether 
by diplomacy or force, given the stake that both China and the United States have in 
creating a tense situation that benefits both their foreign policy interests and aims in the 
region. Furthermore, nuclear deterrence just does not have the same effect as between a 
non-nuclear state and a nuclear one. Thus, the environment where nuclear weapons 
serves as coercive diplomacy is less effective with North Korea. Only by taking all these 
various elements into consideration can there be more impact when approaching the issue 
of North Korean denuclearization. Thus far, much of the policies towards North Korea 
and denuclearization have failed to consider these elements, which has not surprisingly 
led to impasse.   
 Deterrence certainly has not created a safer international community, where the 
threat of nuclear weapons by countries such as the United States and China has hindered 
other states to shy away from the development of nuclear weapons. In fact, the opposite 
seems true. The need for nuclear weapons arises from the security dilemma. For South 
Africa, the need for nuclear weapons was partly due to its perceived threat from Soviet 
forces in new governments in southern Africa. But the use of nuclear weapons provided 
South Africa with a key bargaining tool for when they would need international 
assistance in the face of an imminent attack against the country. Nuclear weapons 




experienced by the apartheid regime, nuclear weapons provided an impetus for South 
Africa’s Western allies to come to its aid when its regime survival should be threatened. 
So it comes as no surprise that nuclear weapons have served as a tool in diplomacy, just 
not really the way Schelling had envisioned. Given the isolation also experienced by the 
DPRK, Kim Jong-un has no other recourse as effective as the development of nuclear 
weapons. While such weapons would certainly cause damage and could initiate a nuclear 
war, the possession of such weapons goes far beyond just damage against an adversary. It 
is a tool that the Kim regime is able to employ in order to gain concessions out of the 
international community, whether through the United States or China, without having to 
give too much up themselves.  
 Furthermore, nuclear deterrence in today’s modern politics seems anachronistic 
all for the reasons based upon the logical and rational thought process of leaders of 
developed countries. As rational thinkers, they would not jeopardize their country’s 
prosperity and stability by engaging with the DPRK in a nuclear war. This causes a 
severe problem when it comes to the efficacy of deterrence. Without the credibility of 
action, in this case the use of a nuclear weapon, deterrence just does not work. Knowing 
that such leaders would not actually use nuclear weapons creates a situation akin to 
appeasement where rogue states like the DPRK are able to push the boundaries further 
without any negative repercussions. And history has shown that this is true. Throughout 
much of 2016 and 2017, the DPRK has tested rockets, missiles, and nuclear material, all 
against UNSC resolutions barring such actions. Yet, nothing really has been done other 
than place more sanctions against the country. Having lived through years of such 




Korea has only increased its provocations, a similar story to what happened in South 
Africa after its embargo. Thus, this goes to show that when backed into a corner, states 
considering their limited options may go for the most extreme to gain the most, especially 
due to the lack of credibility of other nuclear powers to actually use such technology 
against them.  
 Deterrence also fails to bring about the results that are desired, i.e. the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula because of past experiences of other countries 
that have given up their nuclear arsenals. Ukraine, although it had one of the largest 
nuclear weapons in the world at the time of its disarmament, willingly gave up its nuclear 
stockpiles due to concessions and agreements made to them by the United States and 
Russia. But decades after such a decision, Russia invaded Ukraine, annexing Crimea and 
occupying parts of eastern Ukraine. Moreover, Libya also decided to give up its nuclear 
weapons program in 2003, but by 2011, United States and European forces intervened in 
the internal affairs of Libya, as the Arab Spring took hold in the country with protests 
against Qaddafi mounted. Soon thereafter, Qaddafi was found, arrested, humiliated, and 
ultimately executed. These two cases of denuclearization and disarmament does not 
present a rosy picture for the Kim regime. In fact, there serve as warnings against 
disarmament. Had there still been a sizeable arsenal in Ukraine, perhaps Russia would 
not have been so eager to invade and infringe upon Ukraine’s sovereignty. In the case of 
the DPRK, questions arise over whether the lack of nuclear weapons would allow for an 
opportunity for South Korea and/or the United States to invade North Korea to unite it 
under the South Korean, U.S. allied banner. The consequences of Qaddafi’s decision to 




denuclearization of North Korea could lead to a similar situation, where if the 
international community viewed Kim’s methods of governance going against their ideas 
and values, they could just as easily intervene where Kim could suffer from the same 
demise as Qaddafi. Thus, historical precedents show that denuclearization and 
disarmament would not be the smart option, not only for the regime but also for Kim 
himself.  
 This lack of credibility regarding international agreements made upon 
denuclearization and disarmament is certain a logical conclusion that could be made by 
the Kim regime. Again, the U.S. experience with nuclear agreements demonstrates that 
the United States cannot be trusted. Despite signing the Iran nuclear deal under the 
Obama administration, President Trump reneged on the U.S. promises, where Iran still 
maintained that it would uphold its end of the bargain but the United States did not and 
has the power to also punish the other signatories that want to uphold the agreement by 
closing American financial services to them. Thus, if we consider Kim as a rational 
leader, there is no reason for him to want to denuclearize. On the contrary, he seems to be 
astutely maneuvering the power politics between China and the United States to gain 
concessions that he otherwise would not be able to do so without the presence of nuclear 
weapons.  
 This study has gone as far to show the complexities of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis, comparing the experiences of other denuclearized states of South Africa, Libya, 
and Ukraine in informing the possible motivations for Kim Jong-un. While we can 
speculate on the many different motivations that create the need for nuclear weapons, one 




perpetuating his rule over the DPRK, the way he wants. The development of his nuclear 
program is enabling him to do so. The motivations of other nuclear states have also 
indicated regime survival, especially in the face of external threats, as a primary 
motivator. Going forward, however, is the question of how to mitigate the threats and 
concerns that motivate the DPRK from abandoning and dismantling its nuclear weapons 
and program. The United States will never be considered an ally or friend, so attacking 
this issue would be harder. But there are other modes that could be useful.  
 In this line of thinking, further research could be done on whether friendly 
diplomacy is more useful in getting other countries to de-escalate and disarm, especially 
with regard to nuclear weapons. Sanctions and condemnation against the DPRK’s nuclear 
program have not amounted to much. Moreover, when looking at the development of 
nuclear weapons programs, such as that in Libya and South Africa, it becomes clear that 
international isolation prompted and sometimes even accelerated these countries’ nuclear 
weapons programs. Today, there is no country more isolated than the DPRK. Sticks have 
been used in dealing with the DPRK, and perhaps more carrots should be used. As the 
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Master of Arts in Government, Security Studies                                                                                          Dec 2018 
▪ Related Coursework: North Korea: Policymaking Primer, Deterrence in the 21st Century, Economic Growth: The 
Politics of Development in Asia, Africa and Beyond, NGOs in Development and Global Policy-Making, Grand 
Strategy: Interests, Choices, Decisions, Consequences, Introduction to Global Security Studies, Statistics and 
Political Analysis, Government & Politics, Global Political Economy, Data Visualization, Research & Thesis  
 
New York University                                                                                                                New York, NY 




Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations                                    New York, NY 
Political Analyst                                                                                                                  May 2018 – Present 
▪ Monitor political developments in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia 
▪ Provide analysis and recommendations to the government regarding issues related to the regions 
covered  
▪ Attend Security Council meetings and follow media stakeouts and press releases. Provide daily 
briefings and reports to the headquarter in Korea  
▪ Closely monitor developments in the United States and their implications and impact on the U.S. foreign 
policy 
▪ Participate in roundtable discussions and conferences and engage with diplomatic community in New 
York  
 
East-West Center                                                                                                                  Washington, DC 
Research Intern                                                                                                           March 2018 – May 2018 
▪ Wrote articles for publication on the political developments in the Asia Pacific and the U.S.-Asia 
relations for the Asia Pacific Bulletin(APB) website  
▪ Contributed research and drafted Asia Matters for America/America Matters for Asia (2018), a flagship 
project of the East-West Center that focuses on delivering information and analysis on the US-Indo-
Pacific at the national and sub-national levels 
 
The Korea Society                                                                                                                     New York, NY 
Research Assistant to the President of The Korea Society                                             May 2017 – Aug 2017 
▪ Assisted with preparations for the president’s (Thomas Byrne) media appearances, speeches, and 
press statements 
▪ Conducted research on policy and corporate affairs related to the Asia-Pacific 
▪ Drafted article submissions to major media outlets and think tanks on the topics of “authoritarian 
regimes and the possibility of internal revolts in North Korea, China, and Vietnam” and “South Korean 
economic growth outlook” 
▪ Attended events and roundtable discussions as a rapporteur and compiled reports and PowerPoints on 
“East-Asia policy, economics, and geopolitical strategy” for the president 
 
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations                                    New York, NY 
5th Committee Intern                                                                                                          Jul 2016 – Aug 2016 
▪ Assisted the 5th Committee counselor with his research on the “Staff Demographics at the UN 




▪ Drafted reports in regards to the administrative/budgetary agendas of 5th committee from the 
perspective of Republic of Korea 
 
Pacific Forum CSIS                                                                                                                     Honolulu, HI 
Summer Research Assistant                                                                                             Jul 2015 – Aug 2015 
▪ Assisted the Executive Director, Brad Glosserman, with his research on the ROK-Japan relations 
(Expanded research from his book, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the 
United States) 
▪ Conducted an additional research and wrote “The Impact of South Korean Social Homogeneity on the 
ROK-Japan Relations” 
▪ Helped coordinate the Honolulu International Forum seminars and attended the events to have an in-
depth understanding of foreign policy issues in East Asia 
 
Emerging Leaders Program, Pacific Forum CSIS                                                                    Honolulu, HI 
Member of Korea Emerging Leaders Program                                                                  Jul 2015 – Aug 2015 
▪ Participated in the US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue & US-ROK Bilateral Strategic Dialogue 
held in Lahaina, Maui in July 
▪ Publication: “Struggling with the Gray Zone: Trilateral Cooperation to Strengthen Deterrence in 
Northeast Asia,” Issues and Insights Vol.15 – No.13, October 2015s 
 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION   
▪ Skills: Microsoft Office Suite (Word, Excel, PowerPoint), Adobe Illustrator, Adobe Photoshop, InDesign, 
HTML, CSS, JavaScript, R, Tableau 
▪ Language Proficiencies: Fluent in English and Korean 
 
 
